Loud Thinking

A Twenty-Year Agenda for Pakistan’s National Reconstruction, Institutional Reform and Economic Self-Reliance.

An evidence-based national reform proposal:

Pakistan’s persistent political, economic, and institutional difficulties cannot be resolved merely by changing governments, replacing political personalities, or obtaining another international financial assistance package. The country requires a fundamental reconstruction of its governance structure, economic priorities, educational system, agricultural practices, industrial infrastructure, and judicial administration.

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has experienced civilian governments, military governments, coalition administrations, and different political experiments. Yet sustainable political stability, institutional independence, economic self-reliance, and equal opportunities have remained elusive.

The central argument of this paper is that Pakistan’s crisis is substantially a crisis of governance, institutional design, accountability, weak rule of law and concentration of power. Political dynasties, elite capture, weak internal democracy, inconsistent policies, administrative inefficiency, and inadequate investment in human development have contributed to the present situation.

The proposed solution is a twenty-year national reconstruction programme built around ten fundamental reforms:

1. Genuine democracy within political parties and the elimination of dynastic monopolies.

2. Constitutionally accountable technocratic administration and merit-based leadership.

3. Universal access to education through a strong publicly financed system.

4. Transformation of agriculture through scientifically validated PQNK practices.

5. Industrial revival through affordable and reliable energy.

6. Twenty-four-hour judicial services and a fifteen-day case-disposal target.

7. Independent accountability and professional public administration.

8. Fiscal discipline, export development, and economic self-reliance.

9. Empowerment of local governments and equitable provincial development.

10. A national performance-monitoring system with measurable twenty-year objectives.

These proposals are intended to stimulate a serious national discussion about how Pakistan can move from political confrontation and institutional stagnation towards a constitutional, productive, and accountable state.

1. The fundamental problem: A system dominated by elite interests

Pakistan’s difficulties should not be attributed exclusively to one political party, one military administration, or one particular period of government. The country has experienced different forms of government, but many structural weaknesses have persisted across successive administrations.

A recurring problem has been the concentration of political influence, economic resources, and decision-making authority among a relatively small group of influential families, business interests, and institutional actors.

The consequences include:

– Limited opportunities for competent individuals to reach positions of national leadership.

– Inconsistent economic and administrative policies whenever governments change.

– Weak institutional accountability.

– Unequal access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities.

– Political appointments and patronage instead of merit-based administration.

– Insufficient attention to long-term national development.

The International Monetary Fund’s 2025 Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment of Pakistan identify serious weaknesses in public financial management, regulatory independence, accountability, institutional coordination, and the enforcement of laws. It also identifies risks arising from regulatory capture and preferential treatment of politically connected businesses.

Moreover, this assessment further provides an important institutional basis for the central argument: Pakistan requires reforms that change how power is exercised, public money is spent, and public officials are held accountable.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: IMF, Pakistan: Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment, Technical Assistance Report No. 2025/098.

2. Breaking the monopoly of dynastic political parties

One of the most important issues requiring national attention is the absence of meaningful internal democracy in several major political parties.

Political parties that demand democratic governance at the national level must themselves demonstrate democratic practices internally. Unfortunately, leadership in many parties remains concentrated within established families, with limited opportunities for ordinary party workers to rise through merit, political experience, and public service.

The problem is not that an individual belonging to a political family should automatically be disqualified from leadership. The problem is the absence of equal opportunities, competitive leadership selection, and genuine democratic accountability.

The Election Act 2017 already contains provisions requiring political parties to maintain elected general councils and conduct periodic intra-party elections. Section 208 provides that party office-bearers must be elected periodically, with no more than five years between elections, and that members should have equal opportunities to contest party offices under the party constitution.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Election Commission of Pakistan, Elections Act 2017, Sections 207–208.

The challenge is to ensure that these provisions are implemented meaningfully rather than satisfied through elections that lack genuine competition.

Proposed reforms:

1. Intra-party elections should be independently monitored.

2. Party membership registers should be digitally maintained and independently auditable.

3. Leadership candidates should be selected through transparent voting procedures.

4. Party workers should have clearly defined opportunities for advancement from local to provincial and national positions.

5. Political financing and party expenditure should be disclosed transparently.

6. Leadership positions shall not be treated as hereditary entitlements or privileges. Any individual holding a leadership position shall be permitted to serve a maximum of one term of five (5) years only. Upon completion of such term, neither the outgoing office-bearer nor any of their direct or indirect relatives shall be eligible to occupy the same or a succeeding leadership position for the immediately following term. This restriction shall extend to close and distant relatives, relatives by marriage (including in-laws), and relationships established through successive chains of family or marital connections. Furthermore, this provision shall apply retrospectively, irrespective of when such family members previously held positions within the Party, and shall not be circumvented through direct or indirect succession, nomination, appointment or any other arrangement.

Pakistan should establish a twenty-year political reform framework under which access to executive leadership is increasingly linked to genuine intra-party democracy, demonstrated administrative competence, and public accountability.

The objective should be to transform political parties into democratic institutions capable of producing competent national leadership from within their own ranks.

3. Introducing a competent, honest and constitutionally accountable technocratic administration

Pakistan should seriously examine the possibility of establishing a time-bound technocratic administration at federal and provincial levels, consisting of individuals with proven professional achievements, integrity, administrative experience, and the ability to deliver measurable results.

The purpose would not be to replace democracy permanently, but to create an institutional mechanism through which national reconstruction can be undertaken without allowing every major policy to become hostage to political confrontation.

Learning from Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore

Singapore’s experience offers lessons in long-term planning, honest and professional public administration, public-sector performance, and economic development. Pakistan should study these institutional practices rather than attempt to reproduce Singapore’s political system wholesale.

The proposed Pakistani leadership should possess the administrative courage to ask every minister, departmental head, public-sector executive, and senior bureaucrat:

– What objectives were assigned to you?

– What have you achieved?

– How much public money have you spent?

– What measurable benefits have citizens received?

– Why have you failed to meet your targets?

– Have you maintained the highest standards of financial and personal integrity?

Public officials who fail to deliver should face independent performance reviews, disciplinary procedures, and removal where justified.

The word ruthless should mean uncompromising towards corruption, incompetence, and misuse of public resources, not ruthless towards citizens, political opponents, journalists, or legitimate dissent.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Research on Singapore’s civil service and state-building, including Jason Lim’s 2026 study, provides a useful reminder that Singapore’s administrative achievements must also be examined alongside questions of political neutrality and institutional independence.

Proposed constitutional framework

A technocratic administration should be established only through a clearly defined constitutional process, with:

1. Transparent and merit-based selection of federal and provincial technocrats.

2. Public disclosure of qualifications, assets, conflicts of interest, and professional records.

3. Parliamentary approval and oversight.

4. A fixed and non-renewable transitional mandate, unless renewed through a constitutionally authorised process.

5. Independent judicial review of executive decisions.

6. Regular public reporting against measurable performance indicators.

7. A defined timetable for restoring or continuing elected representative government through constitutional processes.

Pakistan should not create further unaccountable power centers in the name of reform. The objective must be strong administration under the RULE OF LAW.

4. Taking responsibility for the entire education system

The Government of Pakistan, in collaboration with educationists, policymakers and industry experts, must urgently recognise an emerging global reality: the rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fundamentally transforming the world of education, employment and professional skills. In the foreseeable future, conventional academic degrees alone may no longer guarantee employability or professional relevance, as the global economy increasingly shifts towards practical competencies, specialised skills, technological proficiency and the ability to adapt to rapidly evolving technologies. Accordingly, Pakistan must urgently reconsider its education and human resource development priorities, shifting greater emphasis from degree-oriented education towards skills-based learning, vocational and technical training, digital literacy, AI proficiency and practical professional capabilities. Particular attention must be given to the younger generation, including those who, for various reasons, have missed out on conventional educational opportunities. With appropriate training, modern facilities, access to technology and industry-oriented skill development programmes, this otherwise underutilised human resource can be transformed into a valuable national asset, capable of participating in the emerging global skills economy. Rather than allowing an entire generation to remain disadvantaged because of deficiencies in the traditional education system, Pakistan must seize the AI revolution as an opportunity to convert its demographic challenge into a competitive advantage in the new world of skills, innovation and technological advancement.

Education is perhaps the most important investment Pakistan can make in its future. No nation can achieve sustainable development while a substantial proportion of its children remain outside the educational system.

UNICEF estimates that 25.1 million Pakistani children aged 5–16 are out of school, representing approximately 35% of the population in that age group.

The provincial situation is particularly concerning:

– Punjab: approximately 9.7 million out-of-school children.

– Sindh: approximately 7.4 million.

– Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: approximately 4.5 million.

– Balochistan: approximately 3.5 million.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: UNICEF Pakistan, Education – Giving Every Child the Right to Education.

Article 25-A of Pakistan’s must become a practical reality as provided by the Constitution:

The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Constitution of Pakistan, Article 25-A.

The constitutional promise is clear. The challenge is implementation.

A child from a poor family living near an expensive private school should not be denied educational opportunity because of the family’s inability to pay. Equally, public schools must not become institutions of inferior quality reserved for children who cannot afford private education.

Proposed national education reconstruction programme

The government should assume comprehensive responsibility for ensuring that every school-age child receives quality education.

This proposal should include:

1. A nationwide programme (with the help of Pakistan’s Armed Forces) to identify and enroll every out-of-school child.

2. A major expansion and improvement of government schools.

3. Free textbooks, uniforms, transportation support where necessary, and meals for disadvantaged children.

4. A uniform minimum national standard of educational quality.

5. Merit-based teacher recruitment and continuous professional development.

6. Modern curricula covering science, mathematics, technology, communication, economics, and critical thinking.

7. Technical and vocational institutions linked with actual employment opportunities.

8. Equal educational opportunities for girls, rural populations, and marginalized communities.

Should all private educational institutions be taken over by the government?

Considering that private educational system is the most profitable business in the history of Pakistan, the proposal to bring all schools, colleges, and universities under government ownership deserves serious national debate. It aims to prevent education from becoming a privilege available only to affluent families.

However, a blanket takeover of every private educational institution would involve substantial financial, administrative, legal, and constitutional questions. It could also create a serious risk of overcrowding and declining standards if the state lacks the capacity to manage such a large system immediately.

A more workable reconstruction programme would have three stages:

– First stage: Bring every public educational institution up to an internationally competitive standard and guarantee admission to all eligible children.

– Second stage: Introduce strict regulation of private institutions concerning admission discrimination, fees, educational standards, teacher qualifications, and access for disadvantaged students.

– Third stage: Consider voluntary acquisition, publicly funded partnerships, or legally authorised public acquisition of selected institutions where this demonstrably improves universal access. Any compulsory acquisition must follow applicable constitutional procedures and compensation requirements.

The long-term objective should be that no child is excluded from quality education because of poverty, geographical location, gender, or social background.

Reform of Elite Private Educational Institutions and Ensuring Equal Access to Quality Education

The Government must undertake a comprehensive investigation into the financial affairs, ownership structures, tax privileges and operational practices of major private educational networks, particularly those enjoying non-profit status or substantial tax concessions while charging exorbitant fees and providing extraordinary salaries, perks and privileges to their directors and senior management. Reports presented before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 2018 disclosed that certain directors of leading private school systems were receiving (eight years ago) monthly salaries of Rs. 8.3 million each, raising serious questions about their financial structures and the actual application of non-profit principles. Equally disturbing is the persistent failure to effectively implement statutory obligations requiring private schools in Sindh to provide free education to disadvantaged children under the Sindh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2013. Moreover, the governments of Punjab, KPK, Balochistan, CDA Islamabad, GB and AJK must also immediately enact and implement laws for free education of underprivileged children under their jurisdictions. The Government must, therefore, commission independent forensic financial and tax audits of all major educational networks enjoying tax exemptions or concessions, scrutinise their directors’ full remunerations, related-party transactions, accumulated surpluses and actual expenditure on educational and charitable activities, and publicly disclose the amount of tax benefits enjoyed by each institution against the corresponding public benefit delivered. All such institutions must be subjected to transparent financial reporting, reasonable fee regulation, strict enforcement of statutory free-education quotas and periodic assessments of educational quality. Genuine non-profit institutions serving disadvantaged communities should continue to receive appropriate fiscal support; however, commercial enterprises must not be permitted to exploit charitable or non-profit arrangements to accumulate private wealth at public expense. A National Educational Equity and Accountability Commission, working in coordination with provincial authorities and the Federal Board of Revenue, should be established to monitor compliance, investigate violations, publish annual accountability reports and recommend appropriate regulatory action.

Furthermore, where investigations establish persistent violations of law, deliberate defiance of statutory obligations, misuse of tax concessions, exploitation of parents or serious financial irregularities, the Government must not hesitate to take progressively stronger measures, including withdrawal of tax privileges, financial penalties, suspension or cancellation of registration, temporary government takeover of management and, where justified by an overriding public interest, lawful acquisition or nationalisation of the concerned institutions in accordance with the Constitution and applicable laws, including the requirement of lawful compensation. The Government should also consider the establishment of a publicly accountable national network of quality educational institutions to ensure that children from financially disadvantaged families have access to education comparable in standard to that available in expensive private establishments. The ultimate objective must be to dismantle the existing barriers between privileged and underprivileged segments of society and ensure that quality education is determined by a child’s ability and potential rather than the financial capacity of their parents. Education is a fundamental national responsibility and must never be allowed to become an instrument for the accumulation of extraordinary private wealth at the expense of generations deprived of equal opportunities. Institutions enjoying public privileges must fulfil public responsibilities, and the right to quality education must not remain the exclusive privilege of the affluent.

5. Agricultural Revolution Through the PQNK System

Agriculture is not simply another economic sector for Pakistan. It is fundamental to food security, rural employment, industrial raw materials, exports, and national economic stability.

Unfortunately, Pakistani farmers face a combination of expensive chemical fertilisers, pesticides, diesel, electricity, irrigation costs, and uncertain agricultural markets.

Pakistan must invest in the alternative agricultural systems capable of reducing production costs while increasing productivity and protecting its soil and water resources.

Introducing the Paedar Qudratti Nizam Kashatkari (PQNK) Agricultural System

The sustainable farming approach is associated with Asif Sharif, a Pakistani agricultural innovator and researcher who developed PQNK, earlier known as the Paradoxical Agricultural Process. PQNK (pronounced “picnic”) stands for Paedar Qudratti Nizam Kashatkari, meaning “sustainable natural farming system.” Sharif says that, given the opportunity, he can help Pakistan generate an exportable agricultural surplus of over $20 billion and create more than 5 million jobs. He further states that the PQNK system substantially reduces agricultural water consumption while more than doubling production at lower cost. Through this system, he says, Pakistan can rebuild a strong economy in the shortest possible time and become a donor to countries in need.

The PQNK approach incorporates practices such as one time breaking of the soil hard pan, permanent raised beds, minimum soil disturbance, biomass mulching, no use of expensive fertilizers and pesticides, hugely reduced quantities of seeds and controlled irrigation. Its objective is to work with natural ecological processes while reducing dependence on expensive external inputs.

According to the tested methods of Asif Sharif “Raised beds irrigation system saves over 80% water. It is much better than drip irrigation. Production is increased by at least 40% and cost of production is reduced by 80% or more.”

In view of the foregoing, Asif Sharif may be considered to form a Public Private organisation directly reporting to the Prime Minister, which should be responsible for increasing agricultural productivity in the country, to create exportable surplus in the shortest possible time.

In this connection, Asif Sharif may be advised to give a detailed presentation of his brain child of Rural Sector Productivity Enhancement (RSPE) which he thinks is the solution for all ills, poverty alleviation, jobs creation and placement, production of food, feed, fiber and industrial raw materials that meet buyers quality and price expectations, wherein, all Agro based industry should be engaged to participate in profit sharing, under a wholistic program.

6. Reviving Pakistani Industry through Affordable Electricity and Petroleum

Industrialisation is essential for employment generation, export growth, technological development, and economic independence.

However, Pakistani manufacturers face high electricity and energy costs, making it difficult to compete with producers in countries where energy is more affordable and reliable.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

The fuel cost of electricity generation increased by 38 percent year-on-year (YoY) to Rs10.8821 per unit in July 2026 from Rs7.7811 per unit in the same month of 2025, mainly due to a sharp increase in the prices of RLNG, residual fuel oil (RFO) and other fuels.

Reviewing IPPs and electricity-sector arrangements

Pakistan should conduct an independent forensic and financial audit of all major Independent Power Producer agreements.

The audit should investigate the following areas:

– Capacity-payment arrangements.

– Actual electricity generation.

– Contractual obligations and performance.

– Fuel procurement and pricing and its reported unlawful resale in the open market.

– Payment calculations.

– Return-on-equity arrangements.

– Government guarantees and its required lawful approvals from the cabinet and the parliament.

– Transmission and distribution inefficiencies.

Where contractual provisions and lawful approvals are demonstrably missing and unfair, renegotiation should be pursued through lawful procedures. Where evidence establishes fraud or corruption, appropriate legal proceedings should follow.

The government must also examine the structure of private-sector gas businesses and their impact on industrial energy costs.

Should IPPs and private gas businesses be nationalised?

This is a legitimate economic policy question, but nationalisation should not be treated as an automatic solution to every energy-sector problem.

Pakistan should evaluate three alternatives:

1. Renegotiation and restructuring of existing contracts.

2. Public-private restructuring under strong regulatory supervision.

3. Public ownership or nationalisation of strategic assets where an independent assessment demonstrates a clear and sustainable national benefit.

Any nationalisation should include transparent valuation, lawful compensation where required, adjustments of continuity of operations, and independent professional management.

The Egyptian Suez Canal precedent

Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company in 1956 is a relevant historical example of public ownership of strategic infrastructure.

However, an important feature of the Egyptian decree was that it provided for compensation to shareholders and established an independent authority to manage the canal.

The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority records that the compensation was subsequently paid in full by 1963.

Pakistan should learn from the institutional arrangements of this experience, not assume that nationalisation by itself guarantees efficiency.

A professionally managed public energy system, if supported by sound economics and transparent governance, could be considered as one option for protecting strategic national interests.

7. Establishing twenty-four-hour courts and a fifteen-day justice system

The judicial system is one of the most important foundations of a functioning state. Without timely justice, constitutional rights become difficult to enforce, commercial disputes discourage investment, criminal cases remain unresolved, and public confidence in institutions deteriorates.

Pakistan cannot claim to uphold the rule of law while citizens wait years for decisions in ordinary civil, criminal, family, commercial, and property disputes.

The scale of the judicial problem

The Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan’s January–June 2025 statistics reported approximately 2.27 million pending cases across the superior and district judiciary at the end of June 2025.

The report recorded:

Category	Pending cases, June 2025
Superior courts	361,677
District courts	1,908,907
Total	2,270,584

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, Judicial Statistics, January–June 2025.

This backlog demands a radical improvement in judicial administration.

Proposal: Courts should operate twenty-four hours a day

Pakistan should introduce a twenty-four-hour judicial service system through staggered day and night shifts and the subsequent need of judges may be met by hiring retired judges.

The purpose is to increase the productive use of court infrastructure, provide citizens with more accessible judicial services, and reduce the accumulation of pending cases.

The proposed arrangement should include:

Day shift: Regular hearings, evidence recording, civil proceedings, commercial disputes, and appellate matters.

Evening and night shifts: Urgent applications, remand proceedings, bail matters, family disputes, selected civil cases, and other matters suitable for extended judicial operations.

Specialised courts: Dedicated courts for commercial disputes, land and property disputes, family cases, banking matters, consumer complaints, and minor offences.

Emergency judicial services should remain available throughout the night, including weekends and public holidays, for matters requiring immediate judicial intervention.

Proposal: Every case should be decided within fifteen days

The national objective should be under the policy of justice delayed is justice denied so that every case receives a final judicial decision within fifteen days of formal registration.

This is an ambitious target and should become a central performance objective of judicial reform.

However, a distinction is essential between the fifteen-day target and the right to a fair trial. A criminal case involving complex forensic evidence, multiple witnesses, or serious allegations cannot responsibly be decided by forcing the judge to meet an arbitrary deadline.

The proposed system should therefore operate as follows:

1. All cases must receive an initial judicial hearing within a prescribed short period.

2. Simple and uncontested cases should ordinarily be decided within fifteen days.

3. Routine bail applications, remand matters, and urgent applications should be decided within hours or days, as appropriate.

4. Straightforward commercial, family, and property disputes should receive a fifteen-day disposal target where evidence and legal requirements permit.

5. Complex cases should be assigned a strict case-management timetable, with extensions requiring written judicial justification.

6. Adjournments should be restricted and properly documented.

7. Judgments should be announced and made available promptly after hearings conclude.

The fifteen-day objective should not be used to deny defendants adequate legal representation, suppress evidence, or prevent appeals.

Article 10-A of Pakistan’s Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process. Any accelerated judicial system must preserve this constitutional protection.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Constitution of Pakistan, Article 10-A.

Additional judicial reforms

– Digital filing and electronic case records.

– Video hearings where legally appropriate.

– Specialised training for judges and court personnel.

– Independent evaluation of judicial performance.

– Digital publication of judgments.

– Improved prosecution and investigation services.

– Adequate legal aid for poor citizens.

– Strict penalties for deliberate obstruction of proceedings, subject to due process.

Judicial performance should be measured not merely by the number of cases disposed of, but also by the quality, fairness, enforceability, and sustainability of decisions.

The ultimate objective is simple: justice should not depend upon a citizen’s wealth, influence, political connections, or ability to wait for decades.

8. Establishing independent accountability and professional public administration

No national reconstruction programme can succeed if public officials are not answerable for their decisions and use of public money.

Public Expenditure Certification

To be signed by every federal, provincial, and local government official, civilian and military, for every expenditure, large or small:

“I solemnly certify that this expenditure is necessary, lawful, and prudent, and that it will directly or indirectly benefit the poorest citizens of Pakistan, who still lack basic necessities such as housing, healthcare, education, food, and security. I accept personal responsibility for this certification and understand that a false declaration may result in disciplinary and legal action.”

Pakistan needs an accountability system that investigates wrongdoing irrespective of the political affiliation, institutional position, or economic influence of the person concerned.

The IMF’s 2025 governance assessment identifies weaknesses in accountability institutions, procurement controls, regulatory independence, and coordination among anti-corruption agencies.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: IMF, Pakistan Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment, 2025.

Proposed accountability reforms

First: Independent investigations

Investigating agencies should be protected against political interference and selective prosecution.

Second: Transparent public procurement

Every major public contract should be published digitally, including its cost, bidding process, successful bidder, implementation timetable, and final payment.

Third: Asset declarations

Senior public officials and elected representatives should submit independently verifiable declarations of assets, income, liabilities, and conflicts of interest.

Fourth: Performance accountability

Every government department should publish annual objectives and achievements. Departmental heads should be assessed against independently verified indicators.

Fifth: Protection for whistleblowers

Individuals reporting corruption, financial irregularities, or abuse of public office should receive legal protection.

Sixth: Professional civil service

Recruitment, promotion, and transfers should be based on competence, professional conduct, and performance rather than political patronage.

Accountability must be applied consistently. It should never become an instrument for settling political scores. Conflict of interest should be declared as a crime for which minimum punishment should be 10 years RI.

9. Reforming the tax system and ending elite economic privileges

Pakistan cannot achieve financial independence while its tax system remains narrow, complicated, and vulnerable to exemptions and preferential treatment.

The IMF governance assessment specifically identifies weaknesses in tax administration, customs, public financial management, and regulatory oversight.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: IMF, Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Assessment, 2025.

A New National Taxation Policy

Government of Pakistan must immediately remove the institutionalized distinction of a “filer” versus “non-filer” where a separate legal or administrative class exists penalizing non-filers with higher withholding taxes and service restrictions on everyday transactions, does not exist in other countries.

Global Tax System Comparison

Pakistan: Uses a distinct two-tier (or formerly three-tier) system where individuals who file annual returns are on the Active Taxpayer List (ATL) and pay standard/lower rates, while “non-filers” are legally allowed to exist outside regular filing while facing severe withholding tax surcharges (e.g., double rates on banking, property, and vehicle transactions).

United States: Operates under a self-assessment and audit-based enforcement system. There is no “non-filer” status that you legally pay a higher fee or tax rate to bypass; failing to file a tax return is a legal violation or tax evasion, subject to IRS penalties, fines, or criminal prosecution rather than a permanent alternative rate category.

United Kingdom: Uses a self-assessment system managed by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC). Late or missing filings incur civil penalties, fines, and accumulated interest, not a parallel tier of legal non-filing.

India: Implements a one-tier income tax system. Non-compliance, failure to file, or tax evasion results in legal penalties, notices, or prosecution under the Income Tax Act, rather than a recognized “non-filer” class with alternate transaction fees.

Bangladesh & Nigeria: Rely heavily on value-added tax (VAT) compliance, direct registration, and withholding taxes at the source rather than a dual filer/non-filer institutional framework.

In most major global economies, failing to file taxes is treated simply as an illegal act or default of tax law, whereas Pakistan uniquely formalizes the non-filer as a distinct, ongoing category within its economic and banking architecture.

The government should:

1. Bring all eligible income groups into the tax system.

2. Ensure that agricultural income is taxed under applicable constitutional and provincial arrangements.

3. Remove unjustified tax exemptions and concessions.

4. Simplify tax laws and procedures.

5. Digitise tax collection and customs administration.

6. Reduce opportunities for discretionary decisions.

7. Ensure that small businesses are not burdened by unnecessarily complicated compliance requirements.

8. Publish annual tax expenditure reports identifying the beneficiaries and fiscal costs of exemptions.

Taxation should be progressive, predictable, and fair.

The objective should not be to extract more money from already compliant taxpayers, but to broaden the tax base and eliminate privileges that undermine fairness.

10. Making Pakistan an export-oriented industrial and agricultural economy

Pakistan must move away from excessive dependence on imports, external borrowing, and short-term financial arrangements.

A sustainable economic model should be built around competitive exports, productive industries, modern agriculture, and technological innovation.

The Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25 provides an important baseline for measuring agricultural, industrial, fiscal, and export performance.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2024–25.

Priority export sectors

– Textiles and value-added garments.

– Agricultural processing and food exports.

– Information technology and software services.

– Pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.

– Engineering goods and light manufacturing.

– Minerals and mineral-based industries.

– Renewable energy equipment.

– Fisheries and livestock products.

The government should provide a stable policy environment, competitive energy tariffs, efficient ports, modern logistics, and access to international markets. In this regard, Pakistan’s Foreign Missions should be motivated with the offer of lucrative rewards for their contributions in bringing FDI and export orders.

Export incentives should be linked to actual export performance rather than political connections.

Supporting small and medium enterprises

Small and medium enterprises must become a central part of the national reconstruction programme.

They require:

– Affordable financing.

– Reliable electricity.

– Simplified taxation.

– Access to modern machinery.

– Digital payment facilities.

– Technical training.

– Export-market assistance.

The creation of productive employment should become a major measure of government performance.

11. Empowering local governments and decentralising authority

Pakistan cannot be administered efficiently through excessive concentration of power in Islamabad and provincial capitals.

Many problems affecting ordinary citizens are local in nature: sanitation, drinking water, local roads, waste management, primary healthcare, public schools, and municipal services.

Article 140-A of the Constitution requires provincial governments to establish local government systems and devolve political, administrative, and financial responsibilities to elected local representatives.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Constitution of Pakistan, Article 140-A.

Proposed reforms

Every local government should receive:

1. Predictable financial transfers.

2. Authority over municipal services.

3. Responsibility for local development planning.

4. Access to transparent procurement systems.

5. Publicly available performance indicators.

6. Independent financial audits.

7. Direct citizen participation in local development priorities.

Provincial governments should not retain unnecessary control over responsibilities that can be performed more effectively at district, tehsil, or municipal levels.

Decentralisation should also be accompanied by accountability so that local governments do not become another center of political patronage.

12. Reforming the energy sector through long-term national planning

Pakistan’s energy crisis cannot be resolved simply by increasing electricity prices or shifting financial burdens between consumers and the government.

The country needs a comprehensive energy strategy that considers the actual cost of generation, transmission losses, distribution inefficiencies, fuel imports, renewable resources, and industrial requirements.

The World Bank’s power-sector analysis identifies transmission constraints, high generation costs, distribution losses, and circular debt as significant structural challenges.

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: World Bank, Pakistan power-sector analysis, 2025.

A proposed national energy strategy

– Expand solar and wind generation where economically viable.

– Improve hydropower utilisation.

– Modernise transmission and distribution infrastructure.

– Reduce technical and commercial losses with effective use of AI technologies.

– Review IPP agreements transparently.

– Introduce competitive and efficient fuel procurement.

– Encourage energy-efficient industrial machinery.

– Promote distributed renewable energy while protecting grid sustainability.

– Develop affordable electricity arrangements for export-oriented industries.

The country should also establish an independent energy planning authority responsible for long-term forecasting and coordination among federal and provincial institutions.

Public ownership, private investment, and public-private partnerships should be assessed according to performance, cost, transparency, and the national interest rather than ideology alone.

13. National unity, social justice and equal citizenship

Economic and institutional reforms will remain incomplete unless ordinary citizens experience improvements in their daily lives.

Pakistan is a diverse federation with different languages, cultures, ethnic communities, and regional identities. National unity cannot be strengthened through slogans alone. It must be built through equal citizenship, constitutional rights, fair resource distribution, and meaningful participation in national development.

The government should prioritise:

– Equal opportunities for women.

– Protection of religious and minority rights.

– Access to affordable healthcare.

– Clean drinking water.

– Social protection for vulnerable families.

– Employment opportunities for disadvantaged regions.

– Fair distribution of public development resources.

– Protection of freedom of expression and peaceful political participation.

No citizen should be treated as less entitled to justice, education, or public services because of social status, ethnicity, religion, gender, or political affiliation. Furthermore, no person holding dual nationality shall, under any circumstances, be permitted to participate in politics or to serve in any government capacity, including federal, provincial, and local governments, as well as public-sector corporations and entities directly or indirectly connected to the government. This prohibition shall equally apply to any caretaker or technocratic government.

14. A twenty-year national reconstruction roadmap

The proposed reforms cannot all be implemented simultaneously. Pakistan needs a carefully sequenced programme with measurable targets, independent monitoring, and continuity across successive governments.

It is recommended to divide the reconstruction programme into four phases.

The twenty-year reconstruction plan

1. Phase I: Years 1–2 — Institutional stabilisation

– Establish constitutional and administrative reform mechanisms.

– Conduct independent audits of public finances and energy contracts.

– Begin intra-party democracy reforms.

– Identify all out-of-school children.

– Launch judicial case-management reforms.

– Begin open demonstrations at farmers fields of PQNK process.

2. Phase II: Years 3–5 — Fundamental restructuring

– Establish a professional, merit-based public administration.

– Expand quality public education.

– Introduce twenty-four-hour judicial services in selected districts.

– Implement the fifteen-day target for suitable categories of cases.

– Expand validated water-efficient farming practices.

– Restructure energy contracts and distribution systems.

– Strengthen local governments.

3. Phase III: Years 6–10 — Economic transformation

– Expand successful agricultural innovations nationally.

– Establish competitive industrial energy arrangements.

– Increase exports and value-added manufacturing.

– Strengthen technical and higher education.

– Reduce dependence on external borrowing.

– Establish internationally competitive public institutions.

4. Phase IV: Years 11–20 — Sustainable national development

– Consolidate institutional independence.

– Establish a mature system of democratic political leadership.

– Achieve universal access to quality education.

– Develop a competitive export economy.

– Strengthen scientific research and technological innovation.

– Maintain sustainable agricultural and water management.

– Ensure equal access to justice and public services.

15. Establishing a National Reconstruction and Performance Commission

One of the greatest weaknesses in Pakistan’s governance is the discontinuity of policies whenever governments change.

A long-term national programme cannot succeed if each incoming administration abandons the policies of its predecessor.

Pakistan should therefore establish a National Reconstruction and Performance Commission through an appropriate constitutional or statutory framework.

The commission should consist of independent professionals, economists, agricultural scientists, educationists, constitutional experts, industrial specialists, and representatives of relevant public institutions.

Its responsibilities should include:

– Monitoring implementation of the twenty-year reconstruction programme.

– Publishing quarterly and annual performance reports.

– Auditing government development expenditure.

– Measuring progress against predetermined targets.

– Identifying institutional failures.

– Recommending corrective measures.

– Providing Parliament and the public with independently verified information.

The commission must not become another expensive bureaucracy or an alternative government. Its function should be monitoring, evaluation, and public accountability.

Suggested national performance indicators

Sector	Performance indicator
Politics	Independently verified intra-party elections
Governance	Merit-based appointments and audited performance
Education	Every school-age child enrolled and learning
Agriculture	Higher farmer income and water productivity
Industry	Competitive energy costs and increased production
Judiciary	Reduced backlog and faster, fairer decisions
Economy	Higher exports and a broader tax base
Energy	Reduced circular debt and distribution losses
Local government	Greater financial and administrative devolution
Social welfare	Reduced poverty and improved access to essential services

Targets should be established after baseline assessments, rather than announcing arbitrary figures that cannot be achieved or independently verified.

16. The constitutional question: How can these reforms be implemented?

A national reconstruction programme must be legally sustainable.

Pakistan’s Constitution already provides an important foundation for several proposed reforms:

Constitutional provision	Relevance to national reconstruction
Article 10-A	Right to fair trial and due process
Article 17	Freedom of association and political parties
Article 19-A	Right to information
Article 25	Equality of citizens
Article 25-A	Free and compulsory education
Article 140-A	Devolution to elected local governments

For further information and reference, please click on the Hyperlink below:

Supporting reference: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, available through the Pakistan Code, Ministry of Law and Justice

The proposed technocratic administration, any compulsory acquisition of private educational or energy assets, and changes to political representation would require careful examination of the relevant constitutional provisions, legislation, provincial responsibilities, and property rights.

Where constitutional amendments are necessary, they should be pursued through the prescribed parliamentary procedure.

A reform programme that violates constitutional protections in the name of national reconstruction could ultimately weaken the very institutions it seeks to strengthen.

The objective should be to build a powerful state through strong institutions, not through unlimited powers vested in any individual.

17. What Pakistan should avoid during national reconstruction

It is equally important to identify approaches that could undermine the proposed reforms.

First, personality-based government: Pakistan should not replace one powerful political personality with another. Institutions must be stronger than individuals.

Second, arbitrary political exclusion: Political parties should not be prohibited from participating in democratic processes merely because they are unpopular or have failed to deliver. They should be required to meet genuine democratic and constitutional standards.

Third, indiscriminate nationalisation: Public ownership must be justified through independent economic assessments, transparent procedures, and professional management. Government ownership without accountability can reproduce the same inefficiencies.

Fourth, rushed judicial decisions: The fifteen-day target must never become an excuse for denying fair hearings, legal representation, or proper examination of evidence.

Fifth, harvest fast track agricultural promises: The PQNK system should be adopted on a fast-track basis all over the country to immediately turn around the rural and agricultural economy of Pakistan.

Sixth, politically motivated accountability: Anti-corruption institutions must not become instruments for punishing political opponents.

Seventh, discontinuity of policies: National development objectives must survive changes in political leadership and government.

These safeguards are essential because national reconstruction should produce lasting institutional improvement rather than another temporary political experiment.

Conclusion: Pakistan needs reconstruction, not another change of government

Pakistan’s continuing political, economic, and institutional difficulties demand a national response of unprecedented seriousness.

The country has experimented with different political governments, military administrations, economic policies, and development programmes. Yet the fundamental problems of elite capture, weak institutions, inadequate education, agricultural inefficiency, expensive industrial energy, delayed justice, and inconsistent governance have persisted.

The solution cannot be found in simply replacing one group of political leaders with another.

Pakistan needs a comprehensive restructuring of the system through which political leadership is produced, public money is spent, institutions are managed, justice is administered, and economic opportunities are distributed. For Pakistan, a stagnant economy is now a matter of survival and national security. The minimum financial requirements of a nuclear-armed state far exceed what the current defence budget provides. Yet nations prosper only when the entire environment surrounding the economy is healthy: economies need a supporting ecosystem of stable institutions, sound policy and the rule of law. Building that ecosystem is the urgent need of the hour, and it requires Pakistan to put the cart (politics) behind the horse (development).

Political parties must demonstrate genuine democracy within their own organisations. Leadership must emerge from merit and public service rather than hereditary privilege. Furthermore, politicians and political parties that have previously held office, including as members of a coalition government, and failed to implement their manifestos should be disqualified by law from sitting in parliament. A professionally selected and constitutionally accountable technocratic administration should be considered as a transitional instrument for national reconstruction.

Education must become a universal public responsibility. The constitutional promise of free and compulsory education must be fulfilled for every child. Agriculture should embrace scientifically validated, water-efficient production systems such as PQNK where independent trials establish their benefits. Industry must receive reliable and affordable energy, and strategic energy arrangements must be reviewed in the national interest.

The judicial system must undergo a fundamental transformation. Courts should provide twenty-four-hour services through appropriate shifts, while a fifteen-day disposal target should become the central objective for cases that can fairly be decided within that period. No citizen should spend a substantial part of his or her life waiting for justice.

Above all, corruption must be confronted through independent accountability, professional administration, transparent public expenditure, and equal application of the law.

The proposed twenty-year national reconstruction programme should be treated as a collective national undertaking rather than the political property of any government or party.

Political leaders, state institutions, civil society, universities, business organisations, agricultural experts, and ordinary citizens must participate in developing and implementing this national vision.

Pakistan has the human resources, geographical advantages, agricultural potential, industrial opportunities, and entrepreneurial talent required to build a prosperous country. What it urgently needs is a system capable of mobilising these resources efficiently and distributing the benefits of development fairly.

The time has come to replace dynastic privilege with merit, political confrontation with institutional cooperation, corruption with accountability, outdated agricultural practices with scientific innovation, expensive industrial energy with competitive power, and delayed justice with timely justice.

Pakistan’s future should not be determined by the interests of a privileged few. It should be determined by the aspirations, rights, and welfare of its entire population.

The real objective of national reconstruction must be to establish a state where no child is denied education because of poverty, no farmer is ruined by the cost of production, no industrialist is forced to close a factory because of uncompetitive energy prices, no honest public official is victimised for refusing corruption, and no ordinary citizen is deprived of justice because he lacks money or influence.

Pakistan does not need another experiment in changing faces. It needs a historic transformation of the system itself.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

15 November 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

www.snayyar.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

Budgets and tax policy matter. But no country has ever been rescued by them alone.

Sound budgets and clever tax policy are necessary but never sufficient. Nations prosper when the whole environment around the economy is healthy. The countries that grasp this will be the next success stories.

For seventy years, poor countries have been handed the same prescription: balance the budget, widen the tax base, liberalise trade, and wait. Some followed it faithfully and are still waiting. The reason is simple. A farmer who plants the finest seed in barren soil does not blame the seed. Fiscal policy is the seed. The ecosystem is the soil, and in most underdeveloped countries it is the soil that has failed.

The 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics, awarded to Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, rested on this insight: nations succeed or fail largely because of their institutions. Where institutions are inclusive, ordinary people can invest, innovate and keep the rewards of their effort. Where institutions are extractive, a narrow elite captures the gains and the rest are taxed, regulated and ignored. What follows is a blueprint of the ecosystem every developing nation must build, in five interlocking layers.

Layer One: Security and Justice, the Foundation

Law and order. No investor builds a factory, and no mother sends her daughter to school, where life and property are insecure. Security is not a cost to the economy. It is the precondition for it.

Justice and the rule of law. Contracts must be enforceable in months, not decades. When a commercial dispute takes fifteen years to resolve, every business learns to avoid strangers, and the economy shrinks to the size of family trust. Courts that are fast, affordable and impartial are the cheapest growth policy ever invented.

Continuity of the political system. Investors need not agree with a government, but they must be able to predict it. Policies reversed with every change of power destroy long-term capital. Constitutional continuity and respect for democratic transitions are economic assets.

Meritocracy. When jobs, licenses and promotions go to the connected rather than the capable, the best minds leave, and the mediocre inherit the institutions. Merit must be the national rule, from the civil service to state enterprises.

Layer Two: Fair Markets Free of Capture

Breaking monopolies and cartels. In many poor countries, a handful of families control sugar, cement, fertiliser, flour or banking and set prices by agreement rather than competition. Every such cartel is a private tax on the poor. Strong, independent competition authorities with real power to investigate and punish are essential.

Ending oligarchy. Concentrated wealth becomes concentrated political power, which writes rules to protect that wealth. Democracies break this loop through transparent campaign finance, neutral regulators and a free press.

Ending rent-seeking, especially in agriculture. Rent-seeking means earning wealth by capturing privilege rather than creating value. In agrarian economies it appears as feudal landholding, tenant bondage, protected prices, untaxed agricultural income and subsidies that flow to the largest owners. South Korea and Taiwan built their miracles on land reform that turned tenants into owners and made farms productive. A country cannot industrialise on the back of a landed aristocracy that has no incentive to change.

Ease of doing business. Registration, permits, licenses and inspections should be single-window, digital and predictable. Every extra signature is an invitation to a bribe.

Cutting bureaucratic red tape. Discretion is the oxygen of corruption. Every rule that can be automated should be, every approval should have a legal deadline, and silence from the state should mean consent.

Freedom of capital movement. Capital goes where it is welcome and stays where it is safe. Credible, stable rules on repatriating profits, convertibility and fair treatment of foreign and domestic investors attract the long-term money that poor countries lack. Capital controls may appear to protect reserves, but they usually drive out the investment that would build them.

Layer Three: Human Capital and Inclusion

Education. Schooling must be judged by what children learn, not by enrolment. A country whose students cannot read a simple paragraph at age ten is not building a workforce but a future welfare burden. Teacher quality, foundational literacy and technical and vocational skills deserve priority over prestige projects.

Affordable health. A sick workforce is a poor workforce. Primary care, maternal health, clean water and nutrition yield some of the highest returns on public investment, and one medical emergency should never bankrupt a family.

Affordable housing. Housing is both a social good and an economic engine. Where land is hoarded, titles are unclear and mortgages are unavailable, families waste decades building homes brick by brick and savings are locked into speculative plots instead of productive enterprise.

Economic emancipation of women and minorities. Half the population is often excluded from the formal economy, and the loss is enormous. When Bangladesh opened its garment industry to women, it changed household incomes, fertility, schooling and social norms within a generation. Removing legal barriers on property and inheritance, providing safe transport and childcare, and ensuring equal access to credit and jobs are not charity. They are among the highest-return reforms available. The same logic applies to religious, ethnic and linguistic minorities: a nation that wastes the talent of any citizen is choosing to be poorer.

Equal opportunity for the weakest. Targeted cash transfers, scholarships, microfinance and skill programmes should lift the poorest into the productive economy so they are not left behind by it.

Layer Four: Governance That Reaches the Citizen

Real local government. Most of what citizens experience, such as schools, clinics, water, sanitation, streets and land records, is delivered locally. Yet in many countries elected local bodies are starved of money and authority and subordinate to distant capitals. Real devolution means elected councils with their own tax powers, budgets and staff. It brings decisions closer to those who live with them and makes officials answerable to neighbours, not distant superiors. Switzerland, Germany and the Nordic countries are among the world’s richest, and all are deeply decentralised.

Strict enforcement of labour laws. Safe workplaces, fair wages, the right to organise and the end of child and bonded labour do not hold back competitiveness. They make a productive, stable workforce possible. The route to export success is productivity, not exploitation.

Layer Five: The Engines of Growth

Modern technology. Digital identity, mobile payments, e-governance and open data can leapfrog decades of institutional weakness. Estonia built one of the world’s most efficient states on digital infrastructure, and India’s digital payments have brought hundreds of millions into formal finance. Technology cuts discretion, and with-it corruption.

Research and development. Nations that do not invest in research remain buyers of other people’s ideas. Universities, industry partnerships, patent protection and tax incentives for innovation move an economy from low-margin assembly to high-value creation. Even modest, consistent investment compounds over decades.

The Reform Sequence:

How to Begin

No poor country can fix everything at once, and the attempt often produces paralysis. A pragmatic sequence looks like this:

1. Start with credibility. Prosecute a few visible cases of grand corruption and monopoly abuse impartially. Reform begins when citizens believe that rules apply to the powerful.

2. Fix the courts and the single-window. These are low-cost, high-visibility changes that restore investor and citizen confidence quickly.

3. Invest in children and women. Their returns accumulate for generations, and few investments are as politically rewarding.

4. Devolve power and money to local government. Do it early, because its benefits come through accountability.

5. Digitise relentlessly. Every service moved online reduces corruption and cost at once.

6. Protect continuity. A national charter of economic principles, agreed across parties, should survive any change of government.

The Verdict

Economic miracles are not accidents of geography or luck. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam and Bangladesh each arrived by a different road, but they built the same thing: an ecosystem in which effort is rewarded, rules are predictable and talent is not wasted. The tragedy of poor nations is rarely a lack of resources or ideas. It is the cost of a system that rewards privilege over productivity.

The good news is that an ecosystem, unlike a mineral deposit, can be built. It takes no gold, no oil and no miracle, only leadership willing to trade the comfort of the few for the prosperity of the many. The countries that make that choice will not merely grow. They will finally be free.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

13 October 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

www.snayyar.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

Point-by-Point Comparison and Proposed Financing of a Futuristic Very-High-Speed Passenger and Goods Railway System

Proposed National Corridor

Gwadar – Karachi – Multan – Faisalabad – Lahore – Islamabad/Rawalpindi – Peshawar – Khunjerab – China Border

PART I — POINT-BY-POINT COMPARISON OF RDA AND SPA

1. Basic Status

Roshan Digital Account (RDA)

RDA is an existing banking facility established by the State Bank of Pakistan for overseas Pakistanis and eligible non-resident customers. It provides banking, payment and investment facilities in Pakistan.

Shining Pakistan Account (SPA)

SHINING PAKISTAN ACCOUNT

SPA is proposed as a new, dedicated development-oriented investment account or investment instrument designed to mobilise overseas Pakistani capital for nationally important, long-term projects.

The SPA would therefore require a separate regulatory, legal and institutional framework and should not be presented as an existing SBP product unless and until formally approved.

2. Primary Objective

RDA:

The primary purpose is to provide overseas Pakistanis with convenient access to banking, payments and approved investment opportunities in Pakistan.

SPA:

The primary purpose would be to mobilise long-term overseas Pakistani savings specifically for strategic national development projects.

3. Nature of the Product

RDA:

RDA is fundamentally a banking-account platform through which eligible non-residents can hold funds and access approved financial products and services.

SPA:

SPA could be structured as a dedicated investment account, bond-linked product, certificate, infrastructure investment vehicle, or another regulated instrument specifically connected with national development financing.

4. Use of Funds

RDA:

Funds can be used for permitted banking, payment and investment purposes under the applicable RDA framework.

SPA:

Funds would be specifically directed toward approved strategic development programmes, such as:

• National railway infrastructure
• Very-high-speed passenger rail
• High-speed freight and logistics corridors
• Ports and logistics infrastructure
• Energy infrastructure
• Digital infrastructure
• Industrial and export-oriented infrastructure
• Other nationally approved development projects

5. Direct Link with Infrastructure Development

RDA:

RDA provides access to investment opportunities but is not itself a dedicated infrastructure-financing vehicle.

SPA:

The defining feature of SPA would be its direct connection with long-term infrastructure development.

A substantial portion of SPA funds could therefore be ring-fenced for approved national infrastructure projects.

6. Investment Horizon

RDA:

The investment horizon depends on the particular banking or investment product selected by the account holder.

SPA:

SPA could be designed primarily for medium- and long-term investment, for example with 5-, 10-, 15- or 20-year investment options.

Longer maturities would be particularly appropriate for major railway infrastructure because such projects require substantial initial capital and generate economic benefits over decades.

7. Return to Investors

RDA:

Returns depend on the particular investment product selected by the RDA holder.

SPA:

SPA could provide a clearly defined return mechanism linked to the structure of the underlying investment.

Possible mechanisms could include:

• Fixed or predetermined returns
• Profit-sharing structures
• Infrastructure bonds
• Sukuk structures
• Revenue-linked instruments
• Foreign-currency investment certificates
• Hybrid investment structures

The final return would have to be determined through proper financial, legal and regulatory analysis.

8. Ring-Fencing of Funds

RDA:

RDA funds are not inherently ring-fenced for one national infrastructure project.

SPA:

A core principle of SPA could be ring-fencing.

For example, funds raised under a designated “SPA National Railway Investment Programme” could be legally and financially separated from unrelated government expenditure.

This would provide investors with greater transparency regarding the use of their capital.

9. Project Identification

RDA:

The account holder generally chooses from the investment and banking facilities available under the RDA framework.

SPA:

The government and relevant institutions would identify and approve specific national projects eligible for SPA financing.

Projects could be selected according to transparent criteria covering:

• Economic impact
• Export potential
• Employment creation
• Regional connectivity
• Financial viability
• Strategic importance
• Environmental sustainability
• Long-term national benefit

10. Transparency

RDA:

RDA operates within the regulatory and reporting framework applicable to banking and financial products.

SPA:

Because SPA would be specifically linked to development projects, it could incorporate enhanced project-level transparency.

Investors could receive periodic reports covering:

• Amount raised
• Amount invested
• Projects financed
• Construction progress
• Project expenditure
• Revenue generated
• Debt and financing obligations
• Expected and actual returns

11. Investor Protection

SPA should incorporate strong investor-protection mechanisms.

These could include:

• Independent project audits
• Independent financial audits
• Defined investment terms
• Clear disclosure requirements
• Separate project accounts
• Professional project management
• Independent oversight
• Periodic reporting to investors
• Appropriate sovereign or project-level guarantees where legally and financially feasible

12. Relationship Between RDA and SPA

RDA and SPA do not necessarily need to compete with each other.

A possible structure would be:

RDA = Banking and Financial Gateway

SPA = Dedicated National Development Investment Platform

Under such a model, an overseas Pakistani could use an RDA to transfer funds into Pakistan and then choose an approved SPA investment product, subject to the final regulatory structure.

PART II — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pakistan has a large overseas Pakistani community capable of contributing significantly to long-term national development.

The existing Roshan Digital Account has established an important digital channel through which overseas Pakistanis can send money to Pakistan and access banking and investment facilities.

The proposed Shining Pakistan Account (SPA) would build on this concept by creating a dedicated long-term investment mechanism through which overseas Pakistanis could voluntarily invest in transformational national infrastructure.

One of the proposed uses of SPA funds would be the development of a futuristic high speed (+600 KMPH) national railway and logistics system connecting Gwadar with Karachi, Multan, Faisalabad, Lahore, Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Peshawar and ultimately Khunjerab at the China border.

The passenger component would be designed around next-generation very-high-speed trains capable of operating at speeds above 600 km/h, subject to future technological development, engineering feasibility, safety certification, route geometry and economic viability.

The freight component would consist of a separate high-capacity, high-speed logistics network designed to move containers, manufactured goods, agricultural products, minerals and other cargo efficiently across Pakistan.

The objective would not simply be to modernise existing railway infrastructure.

The objective would be to create a new-generation national transport system designed for the Pakistan of the future.

PART III — PROPOSED USE OF SPA FUNDS FOR A FUTURISTIC NATIONAL RAILWAY

1. National Vision

SPA funds could be utilised, subject to the necessary legal, regulatory, financial and project approvals, to finance a transformational national railway programme.

The long-term vision would be:

Gwadar → Karachi → Multan → Faisalabad → Lahore → Islamabad/Rawalpindi → Peshawar → Khunjerab → China Border

This corridor would connect:

• Arabian Sea access
• Major commercial cities
• Industrial centers
• Agricultural regions
• Major population centers
• The national capital region
• All the four provinces
• The China-Pakistan economic corridor
• The northern border and potential future Central Asian connections

PART IV — VERY-HIGH-SPEED PASSENGER RAIL

1. Above 600 km/h Future Train Technology

The passenger railway should be conceived as a future-generation very-high-speed railway, with an ultimate design objective of operating passenger trains at more than 600 km/h.

This should be treated as a long-term technological objective rather than a claim about the capabilities of Pakistan’s present railway network.

The system could incorporate technologies such as:

• Advanced electric propulsion
• Aerodynamic trainsets
• Dedicated high-speed alignments
• Advanced signaling
• Automatic train control
• Platform-screen safety systems
• Advanced telecommunications
• Predictive maintenance
• Artificial-intelligence-assisted railway operations
• Advanced braking systems
• High-capacity power systems
• Potential future magnetic-levitation or other next-generation propulsion technologies, subject to feasibility

The final technology should be selected only after detailed engineering, economic, safety and environmental studies.

2. Dedicated High-Speed Infrastructure

Passenger trains operating above 600 km/h would require infrastructure fundamentally different from conventional railway lines.

The system would require, among other things:

• Dedicated passenger tracks or guideways
• Very large-radius curves
• Carefully controlled gradients
• Grade separation
• No conventional level crossings
• Advanced signaling
• Secure railway corridors
• High-capacity electrical infrastructure
• Specially engineered bridges and tunnels
• Advanced maintenance facilities

The railway therefore should be planned as a new-generation infrastructure system rather than simply an upgrade of existing conventional tracks.

PART V — HIGH-SPEED GOODS AND FREIGHT RAILWAY

The national railway programme should include a dedicated freight and logistics component.

Passenger trains and freight trains have different operating requirements. Therefore, the freight system should be designed around high capacity, reliability, efficient loading and unloading, and competitive operating costs.

The freight network could transport:

• Rail-based mobile missiles launching systems for second strike enhanced capabilities
• Containers
• Industrial machinery
• Automobiles
• Agricultural commodities
• Minerals
• Textiles
• Manufactured products
• Energy-related equipment
• E-commerce shipments
• Imports and exports
• Gwadar port cargo

Strategic freight terminals could be developed near major industrial and commercial centers.

PART VI — GWADAR AS THE SOUTHERN GATEWAY

Gwadar could become the southern maritime gateway of the national railway system.

A modern railway connection from Gwadar through Karachi and onward to the major industrial and population centers could provide a direct land-based logistics route across Pakistan.

The long-term objective would be to integrate:

Gwadar Port → National Freight Railway → Industrial Centers → Peshawar → Khunjerab/China

This would create a continuous strategic logistics corridor extending from the Arabian Sea toward China’s border.

PART VII — MAJOR NATIONAL RAILWAY CORRIDOR

Gwadar

Maritime gateway, port logistics and international trade.

Karachi

Pakistan’s largest commercial and industrial center and a major national logistics hub.

Multan

Agricultural, industrial and commercial center connecting southern and central Pakistan.

Faisalabad

Major textile and industrial center requiring efficient passenger and freight connectivity.

Lahore

One of Pakistan’s principal economic, commercial, educational and population centers.

Islamabad/Rawalpindi

National capital region and major administrative, commercial and technological center.

Peshawar

Strategic gateway toward Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Afghanistan and the northwestern region.

Khunjerab

Long-term northern terminus and strategic connection toward China.

PART VIII — PROPOSED SPA FINANCING MODEL

SPA could be structured as a dedicated investment platform for Pakistan’s overseas citizens.

For example, a future SPA programme could offer different investment categories:

SPA-5

Five-year investment option.

SPA-10

Ten-year infrastructure investment option.

SPA-15

Fifteen-year long-term national development investment option.

SPA-20

Twenty-year strategic infrastructure investment option.

These are illustrative structures and would require detailed financial modelling and regulatory approval.

PART IX — ILLUSTRATIVE $10 BILLION SPA RAILWAY PROGRAMME

If a future SPA programme were to mobilise US$10 billion, the funds could, for illustration, be allocated across major components such as:

| Component                                                                         | Illustrative Allocation |

| Very-high-speed passenger infrastructure                         |      US$3.0 billion |

| Freight and logistics railway                                                  |      US$2.0 billion |

| Track/guideway and civil works                                            |      US$1.5 billion |

| Stations and multimodal terminals                                      |      US$1.0 billion |

| Signaling, communications and control systems                |    US$0.75 billion |

| Power and electrification                                                        |    US$0.75 billion |

| Engineering, feasibility, land and project preparation       |     US$0.50 billion |

| Total                                                                                            |    US$10.0 billion |

These figures are illustrative only and should not be interpreted as a completed project cost estimate.

A proper feasibility study would determine the actual capital requirement.

PART X — PHASED IMPLEMENTATION

The programme could be implemented in stages.

Phase 1 — National Feasibility and Technology Programme

• Route studies
• Geological investigations
• Demand analysis
• Engineering feasibility
• Environmental assessment
• Land and corridor assessment
• Technology evaluation
• Financial modelling
• International technology partnerships

Phase 2 — Priority Economic Corridors

Initial construction could focus on sections with high passenger and freight demand.

Potential priority sections could include:

Karachi–Lahore

Lahore–Islamabad/Rawalpindi

Islamabad/Rawalpindi–Peshawar

with subsequent expansion toward Gwadar and Khunjerab.

The exact sequencing should be determined by feasibility studies rather than predetermined political or administrative preferences.

Phase 3 — Northern Extension

Development toward Peshawar and subsequently the Khunjerab region could create the long-term northern component of the national system.

Phase 4 — Complete National Network

The ultimate objective would be an integrated national system connecting north with south.

PART XI — SPA GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

To establish investor confidence, SPA should have an independent governance framework.

A proposed structure could include:

SPA Investment Authority

Responsible for overall investment management.

National Railway Development Company

Responsible for railway project development and implementation.

Independent Engineering Authority

Responsible for technical standards and safety.

Independent Financial Auditor

Responsible for auditing SPA funds.

Project Monitoring Unit

Responsible for monitoring construction progress and expenditure.

Investor Reporting System

Providing periodic financial and project-performance reports to SPA investors.

PART XII — POTENTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS

A successful futuristic railway system could potentially contribute to:

• Reduced domestic travel times
• Lower logistics costs
• Greater industrial connectivity
• Increased tourism
• Expansion of domestic commerce
• Improved agricultural market access
• Increased port utilisation
• Greater export competitiveness
• New industrial development around railway corridors
• Technology transfer
• Skilled employment
• Construction-sector activity

Integration of Pakistan’s major economic regions. The economic benefits should be quantified through formal cost-benefit and macroeconomic studies before investment decisions are made.

PART XIII — PAKISTAN’S FUTURE TRANSPORT MODEL

The proposed system should not be viewed merely as a railway project.

It could become a national unity, cohesiveness, mobility and logistics platform integrating:

Very-High-Speed Passenger Rail

High-Speed Freight Rail

Ports

Airports

Industrial Zones

Dry Ports

Warehouses

Logistics Parks

Urban Public Transport

Digital Freight Management

The objective would be to create an integrated national transportation ecosystem.

PART XIV — THE LONG-TERM VISION

Pakistan should plan beyond the limitations of today’s railway technology.

The ultimate vision would be a country where a passenger can travel between major Pakistani cities in a fraction of today’s journey times, while goods can move rapidly and reliably between ports, industrial centers and international borders.

A future passenger railway operating at more than 600 km/h could transform the geographical relationship between Pakistan’s major cities.

At the same time, a dedicated high-capacity freight railway could transform the movement of goods from Gwadar and Karachi toward the industrial centers of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and ultimately the Khunjerab border.

The combination of these two systems could form the backbone of a future national transportation network.

PART XV — CONCLUSION

The proposed Shining Pakistan Account (SPA) could complement the existing Roshan Digital Account by providing overseas Pakistanis with a dedicated opportunity to participate in a sort of Pakistan Development Fund in long-term national development financing.

Where RDA primarily provides a banking and investment gateway, SPA could be structured as a purpose-driven national development investment platform.

Subject to appropriate legislation, regulation, financial structuring and feasibility studies, SPA funds could be utilised for a transformational national railway programme extending length and breadth of the country.

The passenger component could ultimately target very-high-speed trains operating above 600 km/h, while a separate high-capacity freight system could provide rapid and efficient movement of goods across the country.

The result would be a long-term national infrastructure vision of historic scale; uniting Pakistan’s ports, cities, industrial centers, and international borders through a modern, technologically advanced transportation network. Financed through the Shining Pakistan Account, with the contributions and confidence of Pakistanis at home and abroad, this vision would transform infrastructure into a lasting foundation for economic growth, national integration, and opportunity. It would be an investment not merely in roads, railways, and connectivity, but in the future of the nation itself; building a stronger, more connected, more prosperous, and truly Future-Ready Pakistan for generations to come.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

30 September 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

www.snayyar.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

             A National Savings Initiative to Mobilise Up to US$10 Billion from Pakistanis at Home and Abroad

Proposed for consideration by

• Government of Pakistan
• Special Investment Facilitation Council
• Ministry of Finance
• State Bank of Pakistan

1. Executive Summary

Pakistan can explore the creation of a dedicated foreign-currency savings instrument called the Shining Pakistan Account (SPA) to mobilise substantial voluntary savings from Pakistanis living abroad and eligible resident Pakistanis.

The core proposition is simple:

2 million Pakistanis × US$5,000 = US$10 billion

The proposed account would offer an indicative return of 8.25% per annum, payable quarterly, subject to final approval of the Government of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan and all applicable regulatory and legal requirements.

The objective would be to mobilise up to US$10 billion in foreign-currency savings and channel those funds into clearly defined national financing requirements while providing participating Pakistanis with an attractive, transparent and professionally administered investment instrument.

At US$10 billion outstanding, an 8.25% annual return would represent an annual payment obligation of approximately US$825 million, or US$206.25 million per quarter, before taxes, administration, hedging and other costs.

The programme must therefore be designed as a professionally structured sovereign financing instrument with a credible repayment mechanism, transparent utilisation of funds and clearly defined investor protections.

2. The Basic Concept

The Shining Pakistan Account would be a voluntary savings/investment instrument through which Pakistanis could place foreign-currency savings into a government-backed programme.

The initial target would be:

Target participants: 2 million

Average investment: US$5,000

Potential mobilisation: US$10 billion

Participation would not necessarily be limited to exactly US$5,000.

Suggested investment levels could include:

US$5,000

US$10,000

US$25,000

US$50,000

US$100,000 and above

This would allow both ordinary savers and higher-net-worth Pakistanis to participate.

The US$5,000 figure should therefore be regarded as the target average contribution, rather than necessarily a rigid maximum or minimum.

3. Why the Shining Pakistan Account?

Pakistan needs reliable sources of foreign currency.

The country has millions of citizens living and working overseas who already sent during FY 25-26 over $40 billion to Pakistan through formal remittance channels.

The Shining Pakistan Account would seek to create a second channel:

Remittance sends money to Pakistan.

Shining Pakistan Account invests STRINGS FREE savings in Pakistan.

The programme could therefore encourage overseas Pakistanis not merely to remit money for family consumption, but also to place a portion of their savings into a formal Pakistani investment instrument.

The initiative could potentially:

1. Mobilise foreign currency from Pakistani citizens.

2. Diversify Pakistan’s external financing sources.

3. Reduce exclusive reliance on international commercial borrowing.

4. Provide overseas Pakistanis with a structured investment opportunity.

5. Strengthen foreign-exchange liquidity.

6. Support productive national investment.

7. Create a direct financial connection between overseas Pakistanis and Pakistan’s economic development.

4. Proposed Financial Structure

The initial indicative structure would be:

Name: Shining Pakistan Account

Target: Up to US$10 billion

Indicative return: 8.25% per annum

Payment: Quarterly

Currency: US dollar, with appropriate alternatives for eligible investors

Suggested tenor: 3–5 years

Principal: Repayable at maturity

Target participants: Overseas Pakistanis and eligible resident Pakistanis

Distribution: Banks and secure digital platforms

Regulatory authority: State Bank of Pakistan and relevant government authorities

Government backing: Subject to final legal and fiscal structure

Reporting: Quarterly public disclosure

The final interest/profit rate should be determined at launch after assessing prevailing international interest rates, Pakistan’s sovereign borrowing costs, the proposed tenor and the total cost of distribution.

5. The 8.25% Return: Addressing the Objection

One of the first questions will be:

“Why should Pakistan pay 8.25%?”

The proposed rate should be explained in the context of Pakistan’s recent access to international capital markets.

In September 2026, Pakistan accessed international capital markets through a US$3 billion dual-tranche Eurobond transaction.

Contemporaneous Bloomberg-reported market pricing placed the yield on Pakistan’s US$1.25 billion 10-year tranche at approximately 8.25% in the September 2026 Eurobond transaction. Details at the following Hyperlink:

[Bloomberg — Bilal Hussain’s Pakistan coverage.]

The Bloomberg reference can be found through its Pakistan coverage:

This provides a useful market benchmark, although the SPA rate should ultimately be determined through a formal assessment by the Ministry of Finance and State Bank of Pakistan.

6. Cost of Mobilising US$10 Billion

If the Shining Pakistan Account successfully mobilises US$10 billion:

Annual return obligation

US$10,000,000,000 × 8.25%

= US$825 million per year

Quarterly payment

US$825 million ÷ 4

= US$206.25 million per quarter

Therefore, the Government would need to have a clear financing strategy for meeting approximately US$825 million of annual return obligations.

At the end of a five-year instrument, the original US$10 billion principal would also have to be repaid or refinanced.

This is why the programme must not be treated simply as a fundraising campaign. It must be designed as a properly managed sovereign financial instrument.

7. Where Should the US$10 Billion Go?

A fundamental principle should be:

Every dollar raised through the Shining Pakistan Account must have a clearly documented purpose.

Possible uses could include:

A. External debt refinancing

The proceeds could be used to refinance more expensive external obligations, where doing so reduces Pakistan’s overall financing burden.

B. Foreign-exchange liquidity

A portion could strengthen the country’s external liquidity position.

C. Export-generating investment

Funds could support projects capable of generating future foreign-exchange earnings.

D. Energy-sector investment

Investment could be directed toward projects that reduce Pakistan’s dependence on imported energy.

E. Productive infrastructure

Funds could support infrastructure projects with identifiable economic returns.

F. Strategic national projects

The Government could identify a limited number of projects with measurable economic and foreign-exchange benefits like mining and refining Rare Earth Metals.

The allocation should be publicly disclosed.

8. Ring-Fencing and Transparency

Investor confidence will be the foundation of the entire programme.

The Government should establish a dedicated accounting framework for the Shining Pakistan Account.

A quarterly public report should disclose:

• Total funds raised
• Total funds outstanding
• Amount utilised
• Purpose of utilisation
• Return/profit paid
• Principal outstanding
• Upcoming maturity obligations
• Administrative and other programme costs

An independent audit should be conducted periodically.

The objective should be simple:

An investor should be able to see exactly how much Pakistan has raised, where it has gone and what Pakistan owes investors.

9. Making the Account Attractive to Overseas Pakistanis

The programme must be extremely easy to use.

An overseas Pakistani should be able to:

1. Open an account digitally.

2. Complete identity verification online.

3. Transfer US dollars from an authorised bank.

4. Select an investment amount.

5. Receive quarterly returns electronically.

6. Monitor the investment through a secure online portal.

7. Receive the original principal at maturity.

8. Transfer eligible funds according to clearly defined repatriation rules.

The investor dashboard could display:

• Investment: US$5,000
• Annual return: 8.25%
• Annual return amount: US$412.50
• Quarterly payment: US$103.125
• Maturity: Clearly displayed
• Principal at maturity: US$5,000 or any allowed invested amount.

This simplicity would be important for building confidence.

10. Multiple Investment Categories

The programme could offer several investment categories.

Shining Pakistan 3-Year Account

Indicative return determined at launch.

Shining Pakistan 5-Year Account

Potentially higher return reflecting the longer commitment.

Shining Pakistan Premium

For larger investments, such as US$100,000 and above, subject to applicable regulations.

Shining Pakistan Resident Account

A version designed for eligible residents with appropriate foreign-currency funding arrangements.

The precise structure would require regulatory and tax analysis.

11. Early Withdrawal

Investors should have a clearly defined early-exit mechanism.

For example, the programme could permit early withdrawal after a minimum holding period subject to:

• Notice requirements;
• A defined reduction in the return;
• An early-redemption fee where appropriate; or
• Market-value adjustment.

The terms should be disclosed before investment.

The Government should avoid creating a situation where investors believe they have unrestricted instant access to funds if the underlying instrument is being used for longer-term financing.

12. Currency Protection

The core product should preferably be denominated in US dollars for overseas investors.

This is important because an investor contributing US$5,000 should know whether the Government’s obligation at maturity is:

US$5,000

or an equivalent amount in Pakistani rupees.

The currency terms must be completely unambiguous.

If a rupee-denominated version is introduced, its exchange-rate risk should be separately disclosed.

13. Sovereign Guarantee and Legal Protection

The legal structure must answer one fundamental question:

What exactly does the Government promise the investor?

The programme documentation should specify:

• Principal repayment;
• Return rate;
• Payment dates;
• Maturity;
• Early withdrawal provisions;
• Currency denomination;
• Tax treatment;
• Inheritance provisions;
• Repatriation provisions;
• Applicable law;
• Dispute-resolution mechanism;
• Consequences of default or restructuring.

A government guarantee, if provided, must be legally enforceable and clearly defined.

14. Digital Infrastructure

A dedicated Shining Pakistan Portal could become the principal subscription and information platform.

The portal could allow users to:

• Register
• Verify identity
• Select investment
• Transfer funds
• Receive confirmation
• Monitor quarterly returns
• Download statements
• Track maturity
• Request eligible withdrawals

The system should be integrated with authorised Pakistani banks and appropriate international payment channels.

Cybersecurity and anti-money-laundering controls would be essential.

15. Distribution Through Pakistani Banks

Rather than creating an entirely new banking infrastructure, the Government could use existing authorised banks and National Savings Organisation.

Participating banks could act as:

• Subscription agents
• Payment agents
• Investor-service providers
• Remittance partners

This could substantially reduce the time required to launch the programme.

16. International Launch

The programme should initially target countries with large Pakistani communities.

Priority markets could include:

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

United Kingdom

United States

Oman

Qatar

Italy

Australia

Spain

Portugal

European Union

Kuwait

The Government could work through:

Pakistani embassies;

• Consulates;
• Pakistani banks;
• Overseas Pakistani organisations;
• Business associations;
• Authorised financial institutions;
• Digital advertising channels.

17. The 90-Day Mobilisation Strategy

First 30 Days:

Establish the programme.

1. Create an inter-ministerial task force.

2. Finalise legal structure.

3. Obtain State Bank and regulatory approvals.

4. Determine final return structure.

5. Prepare the prospectus.

6. Establish investor-protection rules.

7. Select participating banks.

8. Develop the digital platform.

Days 31–60

Prepare the international launch.

1. Train participating banks.

2. Establish digital onboarding.

3. Prepare international marketing.

4. Establish overseas Pakistani contact networks.

5. Open pre-registration.

6. Publish FAQs and full terms.

7. Begin institutional and community outreach.

Days 61–90

Launch internationally.

1. Open subscriptions.

2. Begin daily monitoring.

3. Publish mobilisation figures.

4. Identify technical or regulatory problems.

5. Expand participating banks.

6. Publish the first transparency report.

18. The $10 Billion Mobilisation Target

The Government should establish progressive targets.

Stage 1

US$1 billion

Demonstrate market acceptance.

Stage 2

US$3 billion

Expand international distribution.

Stage 3

US$5 billion

Establish the programme as a major national financing channel.

 Stage 4

US$10 billion

Reach the full initial mobilisation target.

This approach would reduce the risk of designing the entire programme around an assumption that US$10 billion will arrive immediately.

19. Different Ways of Reaching US$10 Billion

The programme does not necessarily require exactly two million investors.

For example:

2 million investors × $5,000 = $10 billion

or

1 million investors × $10,000 = $10 billion

or

500,000 investors × $20,000 = $10 billion

or

200,000 investors × $50,000 = $10 billion

A combination of small and large investors could therefore achieve the target.

The objective should be:

US$10 billion of total mobilisation

rather than a rigid requirement for exactly two million accounts.

20. Why Trust Will Matter More Than Advertising

No marketing campaign can compensate for a lack of confidence.

The programme should therefore make transparency its principal marketing tool.

The Government should publish:

• How much has been raised
• How much has been spent
• What the money was spent on
• How much return has been paid
• How much principal remains outstanding
• When repayments are due

A real-time or regularly updated public dashboard could make the programme substantially more credible.

21. Independent Oversight

A supervisory committee could include representatives from:

• Ministry of Finance
• State Bank of Pakistan
• Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, where applicable
• Participating banks
• Independent auditors
• Relevant legal and financial experts

The committee’s role should include monitoring:

• Mobilisation;
• Utilisation;
• Compliance;
• Liquidity;
• Repayment obligations;
• Investor complaints;
• Transparency.

22. Tax Treatment

• The Government should clearly state the tax treatment before launch.
• Investors should know:
• Whether the return is taxable in Pakistan;
• Whether withholding tax applies;
• Whether overseas investors are subject to any Pakistani tax;
• How tax residency affects treatment;
• Whether any tax treaty applies;
• Whether principal repayment is tax-neutral.

Uncertainty over tax treatment could discourage participation.

23. Inheritance and Succession

A particularly important feature for overseas Pakistanis would be simple inheritance arrangements.

The programme should provide a straightforward mechanism allowing the investment to be transferred to nominated beneficiaries in the event of the investor’s death, subject to applicable law.

This should be explained clearly when the account is opened.

24. Marketing Message

The programme should avoid exaggerated promises.

A possible national message would be:

SHINING PAKISTAN

Invest in Pakistan. Earn transparently. Build the future.

US$5,000 can become part of a US$10 billion national savings programme.

2 million Pakistanis × US$5,000 = US$10 billion

The emphasis should be on:

• Security
• Transparency
• Competitive return
• Quarterly income
• Digital convenience
• Clear maturity
• National investment

25. Frequently Asked Questions

Why should I invest?

The account would provide an opportunity for Pakistanis to place foreign-currency savings into a formally structured Pakistani sovereign financing instrument, subject to its final terms and risks.

Is 8.25% guaranteed?

Only if the final legal documentation explicitly establishes that rate. The 8.25% figure should initially be regarded as a proposed/indicative rate.

Why 8.25%?

It is broadly comparable with recent market pricing associated with Pakistan’s international sovereign borrowing, including the Bloomberg-reported yield on the 10-year tranche of the September 2026 Eurobond transaction.

Where will my money go?

The Government should publish the approved categories of utilisation and report actual utilisation periodically.

Will I receive quarterly payments?

That would be one of the defining features of the proposed account, subject to the final legal terms.

Will my US-dollar principal be returned in dollars?

For a dollar-denominated account, this should be clearly specified in the final terms.

Can I withdraw early?

The programme should provide a defined early-redemption mechanism, subject to its terms.

Who supervises the programme?

The State Bank, Ministry of Finance and other relevant authorities would oversee the programme within their respective legal mandates.

26. The Most Important Financial Discipline

The Shining Pakistan Account must not become another source of short-term borrowing used to postpone an underlying financing problem.

The Government should establish a debt-management framework before launching the programme.

For every US$1 raised, officials should be able to answer:

• Why was it raised?
• Where was it deployed?
• What return or economic benefit is expected?
• How will the Government pay the investor?
• How will the US$1 principal ultimately be repaid?

This discipline would distinguish the programme from an ordinary fundraising campaign.

27. Proposed Initial Target

The first formal target should be:

US$10 BILLION

with an initial average contribution assumption of:

US$5,000

from:

2 MILLION PARTICIPANTS

The Government should nevertheless retain flexibility regarding the actual number of investors and average investment.

28. Conclusion

The Shining Pakistan Account is based on a simple proposition:

Pakistanis should have the opportunity to invest their savings in Pakistan through a transparent, professionally managed and properly regulated national savings instrument.

The arithmetic is compelling:

2,000,000 × US$5,000 = US$10 billion

But the success of the programme will not ultimately depend on arithmetic.

• It will depend on trust.
• Trust must be created through:
• A credible return
• Strong legal protection
• Dollar clarity
• Quarterly payments
• Easy digital access
• Transparent use of funds
• Independent oversight
• A credible repayment plan

If those conditions are established, the Shining Pakistan Account could provide Pakistan with an additional channel for mobilising foreign-currency savings from its own citizens while giving participating Pakistanis a clearly defined financial instrument through which they can invest in the country’s future.

SHINING PAKISTAN ACCOUNT

From Pakistanis.

For Pakistan.

For a stronger and more financially secure Pakistan.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

29 September 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

www.snayyar.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

A Deserving Case on Sacrifice, Strategic Power, Diplomacy and Global Responsibility

The United Nations Security Council was created in 1945 for a world that no longer exists.

Its permanent membership remains essentially frozen in the geopolitical realities of the Second World War, while the strategic center of gravity of the modern world has shifted dramatically toward Asia, the Middle East and the Global South.

Pakistan represents precisely the kind of country that a reformed Security Council can no longer afford to exclude.

Pakistan is a country of more than 260 million people, one of the world’s eight declared nuclear-armed states, one of the UN’s longest-serving and largest contributors to peacekeeping, a frontline state in successive international conflicts, spearhead of 57 member states Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and a pivotal power in South Asian security, and an increasingly important diplomatic bridge between competing global and regional powers.

But Pakistan’s case is not merely about size.

It is about sacrifice, responsibility, strategic capability, diplomacy, deterrence and service to international peace.

Pakistan has repeatedly paid the price when the international community needed soldiers.

Pakistan has repeatedly absorbed the consequences when great-power conflicts reached its neighbourhood.

Pakistan has repeatedly stood between competing powers when diplomacy became difficult.

And in 2026, Pakistan has demonstrated something even more consequential: the ability to mediate between major adversaries and simultaneously help construct a new regional collective-security architecture.

The case for Pakistan’s permanent membership is therefore compelling.

1. Pakistan has shed blood under the UN flag for more than six decades

Pakistan’s first and perhaps most morally powerful claim is its extraordinary record of UN peacekeeping.

For decades, Pakistani soldiers and police personnel have served in some of the world’s most dangerous conflict zones with extremely high number of fatalities.

The United Nations itself describes Pakistan as one of its longest-serving and largest contributors to UN peacekeeping. Pakistani personnel have served across Africa, the Middle East, Europe and Asia, often in environments where the distinction between peacekeeping and combat has been painfully thin.

Pakistan’s contribution has never been merely numerical.

Its 172 personnel have been killed while carrying out UN mandates.

They have protected civilians.

They have escorted humanitarian operations.

They have maintained ceasefires.

They have confronted armed groups.

And they have stood in harm’s way when countries with far greater economic resources were unwilling to assume comparable risks.

This creates a fundamental question of international justice:

If Pakistan can be trusted with the lives of its soldiers to implement Security Council decisions, why should Pakistan be permanently excluded from the Council that makes those decisions?

The Security Council exercises authority over peacekeeping missions in which Pakistani personnel serve and many times die.

Pakistan has therefore already demonstrated its willingness to carry the responsibilities of the Council.

A permanent seat would simply give Pakistan an appropriate voice in the institution whose mandates its people have repeatedly sacrificed to implement.

2. Somalia demonstrated Pakistan’s willingness to pay the ultimate price for international peace

Pakistan’s role in Somalia remains one of the most powerful examples of its commitment to collective security.

During UNOSOM II, Pakistani troops operated in extraordinarily dangerous circumstances in Mogadishu.

On 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed and dozens wounded in an ambush while serving under the UN mission.

Pakistan nevertheless continued its mission.

During the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, Pakistani UN peacekeeping troops provided crucial armor and combat support to form the vanguard of the midnight rescue convoy that extracted trapped U.S. Rangers and Delta Force soldiers. Pakistani tanks and armored units were positioned at the front of the nearly two-mile-long relief column, breaking through heavy militia opposition to reach the besieged American soldiers. Units like the 15th Frontier Force Regiment and 19th Lancers provided intense covering fire, suppressed hostile positions, and secured the withdrawal route as stranded personnel were loaded into the rescue vehicles.

Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, the deputy commander of U.S. forces in Somalia, acknowledged that many American soldiers survived due to the skill, readiness, and bravery of the Pakistani personnel who fought alongside them in the joint rescue operation.  

The historical significance is larger than any single tactical episode.

Pakistan was there because the international community had mandated an operation.

Pakistani soldiers accepted the danger.

Pakistani soldiers died.

And Pakistan remained committed to the mission.

That is what international responsibility looks like when it is measured in human lives rather than diplomatic speeches.

The Security Council should remember that contribution.

3. Pakistan is a nuclear power at the center of one of the world’s most consequential strategic fault lines

Pakistan is one of only eight declared nuclear-armed states in the world. SIPRI’s 2026 assessment estimates Pakistan’s nuclear inventory at approximately 170 warheads at the beginning of 2026.

Pakistan’s nuclear status cannot be treated as a regional footnote.

It is central to the international security equation because Pakistan exists within a strategic environment involving:

Pakistan — India — China — the United States — the Gulf — and the wider international system.

Pakistan’s relationship with India is a nuclear relationship.

India’s relationship with China is a nuclear relationship.

China is a permanent member of the Security Council.

The United States and China are global strategic competitors.

Therefore, Pakistan’s nuclear security environment is inseparable from the broader architecture of global peace and security.

A Security Council that debates nuclear proliferation, deterrence, strategic stability and escalation cannot logically treat Pakistan as permanently peripheral.

Pakistan is already part of the nuclear architecture that the Council is supposed to manage.

Permanent representation would bring that reality into the Council itself.

4. The May 2025 conflict demonstrated Pakistan’s strategic and military significance

The May 2025 India-Pakistan confrontation demonstrated once again that Pakistan is not simply a regional observer.

It is a major military actor whose actions can immediately affect international security.

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2025 report to Congress specifically described Pakistan’s military success during the four-day clash as showcasing Chinese weaponry and examined the implications for China’s defence relationship with Pakistan.

The significance extends beyond competing national narratives over individual battlefield events.

The confrontation demonstrated that a conflict involving Pakistan can simultaneously involve:

• Two nuclear-armed states;
• Chinese military technology;
• Advanced air warfare;
• Great-power strategic competition;
• Global diplomatic intervention;
• And the ever-present danger of nuclear escalation.

The lesson for the Security Council is unmistakable:

Pakistan is not a peripheral security actor. Pakistan is one of the states at the center of the Asian strategic equation.

Any serious institution responsible for international peace must reflect that reality.

5. Pakistan has repeatedly absorbed the consequences of wars fought for the wider international system

Few countries can claim to have repeatedly found themselves on the frontline when major-power conflicts reached their region.

Pakistan can.

During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan became the principal frontline state.

Millions of Afghan refugees crossed into Pakistan.

The conflict transformed Pakistan’s security environment.

The consequences included refugees, weapons proliferation, militancy, economic pressures and profound long-term security challenges.

After 2001, the pattern repeated itself.

Pakistan became a frontline state in the international campaign against terrorism while simultaneously fighting terrorist organizations on its own territory.

Pakistan’s armed forces, police and civilians suffered enormous losses.

The central point is this:

Pakistan has repeatedly paid a national price for international and regional security crises that were larger than Pakistan itself.

Its strategic geography has repeatedly made it indispensable.

Its people have repeatedly paid the bill.

Its military has repeatedly carried the burden.

That history deserves representation at the highest level of the international security system.

6. Pakistan fought terrorism at home while supporting the international campaign abroad

After 9/11, Pakistan became flag bearer of the central states in the international campaign against war on terror.

But Pakistan was not merely providing logistical assistance from a safe distance.

Pakistan itself became a major battlefield.

Terrorist organizations attacked Pakistani soldiers, police, civilians, schools, mosques, markets and government institutions.

Pakistan conducted major military operations against militant organizations while simultaneously supporting international counterterrorism efforts.

The resulting experience gave Pakistan an understanding of terrorism that few other countries possess.

Pakistan understands terrorism as:

A military threat;

A border-security challenge;

An intelligence challenge;

A humanitarian crisis;

A refugee problem;

An economic problem;

And a long-term governance challenge.

That experience is directly relevant to the Security Council.

A permanent Pakistani seat would give the Council the institutional perspective of a country that has actually fought terrorism on an enormous scale rather than merely debating it.

7. Pakistan’s geography makes it indispensable to the international security architecture

Pakistan occupies one of the most strategically consequential geographical positions on Earth.

It sits at the intersection of:

South Asia;

Central Asia;

China;

Afghanistan;

Iran;

The Arabian Sea;

The Gulf;

And the wider Middle East.

To Pakistan’s east lies India.

To its west lie Afghanistan and Iran.

To its north lies China.

To its south lies the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

This geography gives Pakistan direct relevance to virtually every major strategic question involving South and Central Asia, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Energy security.

Maritime security.

Counterterrorism.

Afghanistan.

China.

India.

Iran.

The Gulf.

Trade routes.

Nuclear stability.

None of these issues can be meaningfully addressed without considering Pakistan.

A Security Council that claims to represent international peace and security cannot permanently exclude a country situated at the crossroads of so many of its most consequential security challenges.

8. Pakistan’s demographic weight demands permanent representation

Pakistan is not a minor regional state.

The World Bank records Pakistan’s population at approximately 255.2 million in 2025.

This makes Pakistan one of the world’s largest countries by population.

Yet its enormous population has no permanent representation on the Security Council.

This is particularly difficult to reconcile with the principle of a Security Council that claims global legitimacy.

The permanent structure was created in a world of dramatically different demographics.

The international community of 1945 is not the international community of 2026.

Asia has risen.

The Global South has risen.

The Muslim world’s geopolitical importance has risen.

Pakistan has risen.

A modern Security Council must eventually reflect these realities.

Permanent membership should not be a museum preserving the distribution of power in 1945.

It should be an institution capable of addressing the distribution of power, population and responsibility in the twenty-first century.

9. The Islamabad MoU demonstrated Pakistan’s capacity to prevent a wider international catastrophe

Pakistan’s case for permanent membership has now acquired an extraordinarily important new dimension:

Pakistan has demonstrated that it can help prevent escalation between major adversaries.

In June 2026, the United States and Iran concluded the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, following Pakistani-facilitated diplomacy and negotiations.

Pakistan subsequently continued to facilitate the process alongside Qatar. Technical-level talks were held under the Islamabad framework, with Pakistan explicitly continuing its role as mediator.

The framework was not merely symbolic.

The subsequent Pakistan-Qatar joint statement recorded a roadmap toward a final agreement, continued technical negotiations, a communication line intended to avoid incidents and miscommunication around the Strait of Hormuz, and a de-confliction mechanism.

This is precisely the type of contribution that the international system should expect from a major power.

Pakistan helped create a mechanism through which adversaries could communicate instead of allowing miscalculation to become escalation.

The ramifications extend far beyond Iran and the United States

A prolonged U.S.-Iran confrontation had the potential to destabilize the Gulf, threaten maritime commerce, disrupt energy supplies and draw additional countries into a widening conflict.

The Strait of Hormuz alone carries enormous significance for global energy and trade.

Consequently, every mechanism that reduces the probability of miscalculation and facilitates communication has consequences far beyond the immediate parties.

It would not be excessive to claim that Pakistan alone prevented a Third World War.

As such, it is entirely reasonable to recognize the strategic significance of Pakistan’s diplomacy in reducing pathways toward a much wider international conflict.

Pakistan demonstrated that it could put itself between adversaries when the stakes were exceptionally high.

That is the behaviour of a responsible international power.

And that is precisely why Pakistan deserves a permanent place in the institution charged with preventing war.

10. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement has elevated Pakistan into a regional security architect

The signing of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye on 7 August 2026 represents another historic development.

The agreement provides that an armed attack against one of the three states is to be regarded as an attack against all three and commits the parties to strengthening collective deterrence and defence cooperation. Pakistan has emphasized that the agreement is defensive in nature and is intended to strengthen peace, security and stability rather than target any particular country.

This is a remarkable strategic development.

The three participating states bring together:

Pakistan — a nuclear-armed South Asian power with major military capabilities;

Saudi Arabia — the principal Gulf power and custodian of Islam’s two holiest cities;

Türkiye — a major Eurasian and NATO military power.

The agreement therefore links South Asia, the Gulf and Türkiye in a formal collective-defence framework.

That is not a routine diplomatic development.

It is the emergence of a new regional security architecture.

Pakistan’s pivotal role

Pakistan’s own Foreign Ministry has explicitly described Pakistan’s leadership and diplomatic establishment as having played a pivotal role in bringing the Makkah Accord to fruition.

The agreement is already moving beyond ceremony.

On 31 August 2026, the three countries established a Strategic Political and Defence Committee involving their foreign ministers, defence ministers and senior military leadership.

They also agreed to establish a permanent Secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Secretary General from Pakistan for three years.

They further agreed to deepen defence-industry cooperation, joint technological development and production.

This is a profound elevation of Pakistan’s role.

Pakistan is not merely participating in the new security architecture.

Pakistan is helping build and institutionalize it.

Pakistan’s Military Presence in Saudi Arabia: From Strategic Partnership to Operational Reality

The significance becomes even greater when the Makkah framework is considered alongside Pakistan’s existing military presence in Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a longstanding defence relationship, and Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry has confirmed that Pakistani forces are already deployed in the Kingdom under the bilateral Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement for training and logistical purposes. Pakistani officials have also confirmed that earlier deployments included Pakistani military assets.

This distinction is important:

the existing deployment predates the trilateral Makkah Agreement and arises from the bilateral Pakistan-Saudi defence framework.

But strategically, its significance in the Makkah context is enormous.

The Makkah Agreement did not create a relationship between strangers.

It placed an already deep and operational Pakistan-Saudi defence relationship inside a new trilateral framework involving Türkiye.

Thus, the Makkah architecture rests upon an existing foundation of military cooperation rather than beginning from zero.

A rare geopolitical and geo-military development

This is where the development becomes particularly significant.

Pakistan’s military capabilities are being connected directly to the security architecture of the Arabian Peninsula.

Saudi Arabia provides extraordinary strategic geography.

Pakistan provides substantial military capacity and operational experience.

Türkiye adds another major military and geopolitical dimension.

The result is a security relationship spanning three strategically critical regions.

That is a development of considerable geopolitical and geo-military significance.

It is also evidence of something even more important:

Pakistan is increasingly being trusted not merely to defend itself, but to contribute to the security of other major sovereign states.

That is the mark of a security provider.

It demonstrates that Pakistan’s strategic relevance has expanded beyond the subcontinent.

Islamabad, Makkah and Ankara: Pakistan’s Unique Combination of Diplomacy and Deterrence

The significance of these two developments becomes clearest when viewed together.

At Islamabad, Pakistan helped create a diplomatic mechanism between adversaries.

At Makkah, Pakistan helped create a collective-defence mechanism among two other huge partners.

At Islamabad, Pakistan demonstrated mediation.

At Makkah, Pakistan demonstrated coalition-building and deterrence among distant partners.

These are not contradictory roles.

They are the two pillars of responsible international security:

diplomacy to prevent war, and credible deterrence to prevent aggression.

Pakistan is demonstrating both.

This is perhaps the strongest new argument for its permanent membership.

Pakistan is not merely demanding recognition for its historical sacrifices.

It is demonstrating current capacity to produce security.

The Larger Case: Pakistan Already Performs the Functions Expected of a Major Security Power

Consider the cumulative record.

Pakistan:

has served under the UN flag for decades;

has suffered fatalities in UN peacekeeping;

has repeatedly deployed forces into dangerous international missions;

is one of the world’s nuclear-armed states;

occupies a central position in South Asian strategic stability;

has fought terrorism on an enormous scale;

has absorbed the consequences of wars in Afghanistan;

represents more than 255 million people;

sits at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, China and the Middle East;

maintains strategic relations with China;

maintains longstanding relations with the United States;

maintains deep strategic relations with Saudi Arabia;

maintains strategic relations with Türkiye;

maintains channels with Iran;

has emerged as an important mediator in the U.S.-Iran crisis;

helped create the Islamabad MoU framework;

and has played a pivotal role in establishing the Makkah collective-defence architecture.

This is not the record of a marginal state.

It is the record of a country already carrying responsibilities normally associated with major international powers.

The Final Argument

The strongest argument for Pakistan is therefore not that Pakistan deserves a permanent seat because of prestige.

It is that Pakistan has already earned the responsibilities that permanent membership represents.

Pakistan has provided soldiers.

Pakistan has provided sacrifices.

Pakistan has provided strategic deterrence.

Pakistan has provided diplomatic channels.

Pakistan has provided mediation.

Pakistan has provided regional security.

And Pakistan has repeatedly provided something the international system desperately needs:

a country capable of speaking to different sides while possessing sufficient strategic weight to make its diplomacy matter.

The Security Council cannot remain indefinitely frozen in 1945.

A permanent institution for international peace cannot permanently exclude one of the world’s largest populations, one of its nuclear-armed states, one of its longest-serving peacekeeping contributors, and a country sitting at the intersection of some of the world’s most dangerous strategic theatres.

Nor can it permanently exclude a country that has demonstrated, in the same year, the ability to help mediate between major adversaries through the Islamabad process and to help construct collective security through the Makkah framework.

Pakistan’s history provides the moral case.

Its population provides the representative case.

Its geography provides the strategic case.

Its nuclear status provides the security case.

Its military record provides the deterrence case.

Its peacekeeping record provides the UN case.

Its diplomacy provides the international case.

Islamabad provides the peace-making case.

Makkah Pact provides the collective-security case.

And Pakistan’s existing defence presence in Saudi Arabia demonstrates that its strategic partnerships are not merely words on paper but are supported by real military cooperation.

The question before the international community is therefore increasingly difficult to avoid:

How can a Security Council claim to represent the realities of twenty-first-century international peace and security while permanently excluding Pakistan?

Pakistan is not asking the world to imagine what it might contribute.

Pakistan’s record demonstrates what it already contributes.

It has served the UN.

It has sacrificed for peace.

It changed the course of modern human history by bringing America and China closer.

It has fought terrorism.

It has maintained nuclear deterrence.

It has mediated between adversaries.

It has helped reduce the risk of wider war.

It has helped build a new regional security architecture after swiftly emerging victorious against many times bigger arch enemy.

And it continues to assume responsibilities far beyond its borders.

Pakistan is not merely seeking a seat at the table.

Pakistan has already been carrying the table.

Permanent membership of the UN Security Council should recognize that reality.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

27 September 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

“An Account of Sustained Advocacy in the Service of Pakistan”

In my unwavering commitment to national service, I effectively advocated, within a brief 43-day timeframe, for the exclusion of references to “Pakistan” from joint statements between India and prominent international partners, including Japan, the United States, the UK, EU, Germany, France, and five Nordic countries.

Full details of the unbelievable success story with the Japanese government are available at Hyperlink: – A Pakistani’s Remarkable Diplomatic Intervention in Japan–India Relations

Despite encountering written death threat, purportedly from the Indian intelligence agency RA&W, my efforts succeeded in ensuring that the Indian government was forced to omit the mention of the name of “Pakistan” as an alleged exporter of terrorism, along with excluding mentions of the “Mumbai and Pathankot attacks” from eight crucial joint statements. Noteworthy engagements included letter to the President of the United States and its communication via Twitter with Prime Minister Boris Johnson and EU President Ursula von der Leyen, and by the dissemination of open letters addressed to the top leadership of Germany, France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland exposing the false Indian narrative and concerns of Pakistan.

A pivotal achievement resulting from these efforts was the removal of the term/word “Pakistan” from Paragraph 17 of the U.K.-India joint statement dated April 22, 2022, following Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s visit to India in April 2022. This change underscores a shared commitment to combat terrorism universally, without singling out specific countries. Its significance is heightened when considering India’s substantial influence over British leaders, as noted by former British PM Gordon Brown in his extremely biased memoir, highlighting Pakistan’s perceived vulnerability and false association with terrorism.

Furthermore, I successfully engaged with European leaders, including Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, President Emmanuel Macron of France, and the leadership of five Nordic countries, persuading them to refrain from including any references to Pakistan, Mumbai, or Pathankot in subsequent joint statements with India.

These historic diplomatic successes are a testament to my proactive approach, involving the authorship of open letters to world leaders. These letters aim to expose India’s alleged false allegations against Pakistan while shedding light on human rights violations and acts of genocide in Kashmir and India against Muslim minorities. Detailed information is provided at the Hyperlinks below:

USA

Joint Statement on the Fourth India-U.S. 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue April 12, 2022 (NAME of Pakistan is mentioned).

Quote.

Counterterrorism and Counter Narcotics

“The Ministers welcomed the convening of the 18th Meeting of the India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and the 4th Session of the India-U.S. Designations Dialogue in October 2021. The Ministers strongly condemned any use of terrorist proxies and cross-border terrorism in all its forms and called for the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai attack, and Pathankot attack, to be brought to justice.

They called for concerted action against all terrorist groups, including groups proscribed by the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee, such as al-Qa’ida, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), and Hizb ul Mujahideen. The Ministers called on Pakistan to take immediate, sustained, and irreversible action to ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks. The Ministers committed to continued exchange of information about sanctions and designations against terror groups and individuals, countering violent radicalism, use of the Internet for terrorist purposes, and cross-border movement of terrorists. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of upholding international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism by all countries, consistent with FATF recommendations.” Unquote.

In this regard, after the Japanese episode I immediately wrote another eye-opening 10-pages open letter (on 13 April 2022) to the US President which was also forwarded to other US government functionaries, proving with international and Indian documents and facts about all the Indian acts of terrorism and its role in sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan, details as below:

An Open Letter to the President of the United States dated 13 April 2022.

Here, again by the Sheer Mercy of Allah (SWT) the NAME of Pakistan was removed in the Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement of MAY 24, 2022

(Here first time in the history of the USA, it specifically changed its foreign policy towards Pakistan within a very short span of just six weeks) and although, Mumbai and Pathankot incidents were mentioned, but the NAME of PAKISTAN (which is a HUGE defeat of Indian foreign policy) was removed as was specifically mentioned in the 12 April 2022 communiqué detailed above, where the name of Pakistan is clearly stated. In fact, it was the cardinal proof of the highly successful impact of my open letter dated 13 April 2022 to the President of the USA.

The relevant paragraph of the QUAD Joint Leaders Statement dated 24 May 2022 (Hyperlink provided above) is narrated below, where it was evident that the NAME of Pakistan was REMOVED.

Quote.

“We condemn unequivocally terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterate that there can be no justification for acts of terror on any grounds whatsoever. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies and emphasize the importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist groups which could be used to launch or plan terror attacks, including cross-border attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. We also reaffirm UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021), which demands that Afghan territory must never again be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks. We emphasize the importance of upholding international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism by all countries, consistent with FATF recommendations. We reaffirm that in our fight against global terrorism, we will take concerted action against all terrorist groups, including those individuals and entities designated pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 1267(1999).” Unquote.

U.K.

I relentlessly continued to serve the motherland and ensured that the Indian government was not allowed to mention the name of PAKISTAN, as a country exporting terrorism, from the below reproduced Para 17 of the U.K.-India joint statement dated 22 April 2022, issued after the conclusion of PM Boris Johnson’s visit to India in April 2022. In fact, I Tweeted to the British PM even before his start of visit to India, my open letters to PM Japan (dated 20 March 2022) and to the President of the USA (dated 13 April 2022) which strategy proved successful and the joint UK-India statement dated 22 April 2022 did not mention Pakistan by NAME anywhere in the 40 paragraphs statement as detailed below.

40 Paragraphs UK-India Joint Statement 22 April 2022.

By the sheer mercy of Allah (SWT) Pakistan’s name was specifically omitted from the Para # 17 of the UK-India joint statement dated 22 April 2022 as below:

Quote.

“Both leaders expressed zero tolerance for terrorism in all its forms – and for all those who encourage, support and finance terrorism or provide sanctuary to terrorists and terror groups – whatever their motivation may be. They called upon all countries to work together to root out terrorist safe havens and infrastructure, disrupt terrorist networks and their financing channels, and halt cross-border movement of terrorists. They reiterated their condemnation of terrorist attacks in India and the UK, including the Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. They emphasised the importance of perpetrators of terrorist attacks being systematically and expeditiously brought to justice, and agreed to work together to take concerted action against globally proscribed terrorist entities and individuals.” Unquote.

EU

India – EU meeting in New Delhi between PM Modi and President Ursula von der Leyen dated 25 April 2022.

India – EU meeting in New Delhi was held between Indian PM Modi and President Ursula von der Leyen dated 25 April 2022. My above open letters to the PM Japan and the President of the USA were also tweeted to her to inform her in advance not to mention Pakistan, Mumbai or Pathankot on the behest of India.

The 25 April 2022 India – EU Bilateral Brief is absolutely devoid of any references to Pakistan, Mumbai and Pathankot attacks as is evident from the preceding Hyperlink, which is another testimony of the success of my humble efforts.

Germany, Denmark and France

Before the Indian PM Modi embarked upon his visit to the above named three countries and for a joint meeting at Denmark with five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) I wrote letters (details as per Hyperlink below) to all these seven leaders (Germany, France and five Nordic nations) exposing Indian genocidal acts against Muslim minorities, which India always tried to hide by falsely maligning and defaming Pakistan with untenable charges of terrorism in India.

An Open letter to seven European and Nordic countries heads of governments to stop genocide of Muslims in India.

The complete success of my above letters can be gauged by the fact that none of the above named seven countries mentioned Pakistan in any direct or indirect manner. So much so, that France which has extremely close defense sales and diplomatic relations with India also refrained to take the Indians false bait regarding Pakistan, which is evident from the given links provided below of all the Indian joint statements with Germany, France, Denmark and five Nordic countries joint summit:

India – Germany

India-Germany Joint Statement, 2 May 2022 (PDF)

India – France

India-France Joint Statement, 4 May 2022 (Élysée)

India – Denmark

India-Denmark Joint Statement (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

India – Five Nordic Countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland & Iceland)

India-Nordic Summit Joint Statement, 4 May 2022 (PDF)

By the sheer Grace and Mercy of Allah Almighty, my direct engagement with 11 prominent world leaders in this international campaign was undertaken with one clear objective: to challenge India’s efforts to divert global attention from allegations of war crimes and grave human-rights violations in Indian-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (IIOJK), and from the reported mistreatment of Muslim minorities in India. This sustained and demanding endeavour shows what determined individual advocacy can achieve: shaping international narratives, bringing overlooked realities before global decision-makers, and helping build a fairer understanding of Pakistan’s position. It stands as proof that persistent, principled engagement can carry Pakistan’s legitimate concerns to the highest levels of diplomacy, and can meet any attempt to obscure them with informed and resolute advocacy.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

22 September 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

In recognition of the supreme sacrifice made by our military, police and civilian martyrs, I respectfully submit the following proposals for the consideration of our leaders.They are meant to honour the families of the martyrs and to assure them that the nation remembers.

1. Income tax exemption: Full (100 percent) exemption from income tax, for life, on the income of the martyr’s parents, wife and children.
2. Property and excise relief: Exemption from property tax and excise duty on the family residence and on motor vehicles owned by the immediate family.
3. National flag: The immediate family to be permitted to fly the national flag at their residence and on their vehicles, as a mark of respect.
4. Free education: Free education for sons and daughters at any institution in Pakistan. Where a child attends a private institution, the government should bear the cost.
5. Dedicated cell: A separate section in the Cabinet Division or the Interior Ministry, headed by a Grade 21 officer, to maintain records and facilitate the above measures.

Many people avoid paying income tax altogether. Recognition of this kind for the families of those who gave their lives for the country would be a small gesture in comparison. It would also raise the morale of serving personnel, who would know that their families will be looked after.

I submit these proposals with the utmost respect.

Syed Tanvir Uddin Ahmad
Senior Citizen
tanviruddin55@gmail.com

How One Citizen Challenged an Adverse Narrative About Pakistan on the International Stage

International diplomacy is usually associated with governments, ambassadors and foreign ministries.

But sometimes, an ordinary citizen can also make an extraordinary contribution to his country’s national cause.

With the blessings of Allah (SWT), I experienced such a moment in March 2022.

Over the years, I have written extensively on Pakistan’s national interests and international affairs and have offered advice and observations to Pakistani governments and leaders, as well as addressing international leaders on important issues.

One such intervention was my Open Letter to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which was also published in India:

👉 Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi

The Japan–India Joint Statement: March 19, 2022

On 19 March 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued their Japan–India Summit Joint Statement.

Its Paragraph 8 contained explicit references to Pakistan in the context of terrorism. It called upon Pakistan to take “resolute and irreversible action” against terrorist networks operating from its territory and referred to Pakistan’s international commitments, including FATF.

The official Japanese document can be examined here:

👉 Japan–India Summit Joint Statement — 19 March 2022

I considered this language deeply objectionable from Pakistan’s perspective.

Therefore, the very next day, 20 March 2022, I addressed a detailed letter to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, challenging the inclusion of this Pakistan-specific highly objectional language and presenting Pakistan’s perspective.

👉 My letter to Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida

🔎 What Happened Next?

Approximately six months later came a development that I found particularly significant.

On 8 September 2022, Japan and India held their Second Japan–India 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo.

The subsequent Joint Statement contained no reference to Pakistan.

👉 Japan–India 2+2 Joint Statement — 8 September 2022

The contrast between the two official documents is striking:

19 March 2022: Pakistan specifically named in the terrorism-related paragraph.

8 September 2022: Absolutely no mention of Pakistan in the subsequent Japan–India 2+2 Joint Statement.

Why This Matters to Me

My point is very specific and documentary:

I responded immediately to an adverse Pakistan-specific formulation in an official Japan–India statement, placed Pakistan’s perspective directly before the Japanese Prime Minister, and subsequently observed that the Pakistan-specific language was absent from the later Japan–India 2+2 Joint Statement.

The historical record speaks for itself.

For me, this episode represents a remarkable milestone in citizen-led diplomatic advocacy for Pakistan.

It reinforced my belief that:

National service is not confined to public office. Sometimes it begins with the courage to speak, the persistence to be heard, and the conviction to defend your country’s legitimate interests before the world.

I remain grateful to Allah (SWT) for giving me the opportunity to contribute, in my own humble capacity, to Pakistan’s cause in international affairs.

One citizen. One letter. One diplomatic intervention. A remarkable chapter in my journey of service to Pakistan.

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

18 September 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.

Question:

“Pakistan’s IPP Crisis: Are Allegedly Excessive and Economically Killing Power Contracts Sustainable—and Could Renegotiation, Contract Termination or NATIONALISATION of IPPs Save Pakistan from a Deepening Financial Meltdown?”

Reply of AI:

Your concern goes to the heart of Pakistan’s energy-sector crisis. My short answer is: Pakistan could potentially nationalise or compulsorily acquire IPP assets, but simply declaring all IPP contracts “odious” and confiscating the companies without compensation would be legally and financially extremely risky.  A much stronger approach would be contract-by-contract investigation, renegotiation, cancellation where illegality or fraud is proven, and selective compulsory acquisition where economically justified.

First: the factual claim needs careful verification

The figure of US$12 billion paid to IPPs in 11 months, and the assertion that all such payments represent subsidies or unjustified benefits, should be carefully broken down before drawing conclusions.

IPP-related payments can include very different things:

• Capacity payments;
• Electricity actually generated and supplied;
• Fuel costs passed through under contractual arrangements;
• Interest and debt servicing;
• Delayed-payment charges;
• Taxes and duties;
• Payments of old circular debt arrears.

These are not economically equivalent. A payment for actual electricity delivered is different from a capacity payment for unused capacity, and both are different from a government subsidy or tax concession.

Your comparison with IMF financing is nevertheless useful in illustrating the scale of Pakistan’s fiscal and energy-sector burden. Pakistan received about US$3 billion under the 2023 Stand-By Arrangement, while subsequent EFF/RSF arrangements have added further IMF financing. By May 2026, the IMF stated that cumulative disbursements under the current EFF and RSF arrangements had reached approximately US$4.8 billion.

So, the broader point is valid: Pakistan’s power-sector financial obligations can be enormous compared with external financing received from institutions such as the IMF.

Could Pakistan nationalise all IPPs?

Yes, as a matter of sovereign power—but not necessarily without a huge cost.

A sovereign state generally has the power to:

1. Nationalise or compulsorily acquire assets;

2. Terminate contracts under lawful grounds;

3. Regulate private utilities;

4. Investigate corruption, fraud and illegality;

5. Change future policy and taxation.

However, exercising that power does not automatically extinguish contractual and property rights.

If Pakistan simply announced:

> “All IPPs are nationalised. No compensation will be paid because their contracts were against the national interest.”

the likely consequences could include:

• International arbitration;
• Claims under bilateral investment treaties;
• Enforcement proceedings against Pakistani state assets abroad;
• Damage to Pakistan’s sovereign creditworthiness;
• Further reluctance of foreign investors and lenders;
• Pressure on the rupee and external financing;
• Increased difficulty financing future infrastructure.

Therefore, nationalisation is possible; uncompensated mass confiscation is the dangerous part.

Could the contracts be declared “odious”?

This is where an important legal distinction must be made.

The doctrine of “odious debt” is not a simple weapon for cancelling IPP contracts

The concept of odious debt is primarily discussed in relation to sovereign borrowing: debts incurred by illegitimate regimes or rulers without benefiting the population.

Applying the same label to private power contracts would be legally difficult.

Calling a contract:

Unfair,

Expensive,

Badly negotiated,

Politically motivated,

does not automatically make it legally void.

To invalidate an IPP agreement, Pakistan would need stronger legal grounds, such as:

1. Corruption or bribery

If an IPP contract was obtained through:

Bribery;

Kickbacks;

Corruption of public officials;

Fraudulent inducement;

that could provide a much stronger basis for challenging the contract.

2. Fraud or misrepresentation

For example:

False project costs;

Manipulated financial information;

Fraudulent fuel arrangements;

Concealed beneficial ownership.

3. Lack of legal authority

If government officials signed commitments beyond their lawful authority, constitutional or statutory requirements were violated, or mandatory approvals were absent, there might be grounds for challenge.

4. Collusion

If private parties and public officials deliberately structured contracts to produce unlawful private enrichment at public expense, that could potentially create both civil and criminal consequences.

5. Fundamental contractual breach

If an IPP failed to meet contractual obligations, Pakistan could potentially terminate or seek damages under the relevant agreement.

The strongest strategy would therefore not be “all IPPs are odious.” It would be: investigate every contract and prosecute or cancel those proven to be illegal, fraudulent or corrupt.

The real economic problem: Pakistan may have socialised risk and privatised returns.

This is, in my view, the most serious policy criticism of many power-sector arrangements.

A badly designed IPP system can create a situation where:

Private investors receive:

Guaranteed returns;

Capacity payments;

Exchange-rate protection;

Sovereign guarantees;

Protection against demand risk.

While Pakistani citizens bear:

Currency depreciation;

Rising tariffs;

Circular debt;

Taxation;

Government guarantees;

Reduced industrial competitiveness.

That structure can become economically disastrous.

The fundamental question is:

> Who bears the commercial risk?

In a normal competitive market, an investor who builds unnecessary capacity should bear some consequences of poor investment decisions.

But if contracts guarantee returns regardless of whether electricity is required, then the consumer and taxpayer can become the insurer of the investor’s business risk.

That is the structural problem Pakistan should address.

Would nationalisation actually solve the problem?

Not automatically.

Suppose Pakistan acquires an IPP.

The government would then inherit:

The power plant;

 Its employees;

Maintenance obligations;

Fuel requirements;

Outstanding bank debt;

Foreign exchange liabilities;

Operational risks.

If the acquisition price is too high, Pakistan may simply convert:

> Expensive private obligations into expensive public obligations.

Therefore, the question should not be:

> “Private IPP or government ownership?”

The better question is:

> “What arrangement produces electricity at the lowest sustainable cost for Pakistan?”

What I believe would be a stronger national strategy

1. Establish a Supreme-Level IPP Contract Commission

Pakistan should conduct a comprehensive forensic audit of every major IPP contract.

The investigation should examine:

Original capital cost;

Actual capital cost;

Financing structure;

Equity returns;

Debt interest rates;

Related-party transactions;

Fuel contracts;

Sovereign guarantees;

Tax exemptions;

Capacity-payment formulas;

Foreign exchange indexation;

Beneficial ownership.

The results should be made public, subject only to legitimate commercial confidentiality.

Sunlight is essential.

2. Separate IPPs into categories

Not all IPPs should be treated identically.

Category A: Fraudulent or corrupt contracts

Where corruption or illegality is proven:

Prosecute responsible persons;

Seek rescission or cancellation;

Recover unlawful gains;

Challenge compensation claims.

Category B: Excessively expensive but legally valid contracts

These should primarily be:

Renegotiated;

Refinanced;

Bought out where economically advantageous.

Category C: Efficient and necessary plants

These should continue operating under revised arrangements where possible.

Category D: Old or inefficient plants

Pakistan should consider:

Retirement;

Conversion;

Acquisition and closure;

Negotiated termination.

This approach is much stronger than indiscriminate nationalisation.

3. Use compulsory acquisition selectively

Pakistan could consider a buyout programme.

For example:

> If an IPP has already recovered most of its investment and is receiving very large future capacity payments, the government could calculate whether purchasing the plant now is cheaper than continuing payments for another 10–15 years.

This requires a strict calculation:

Present value of future contractual payments

versus

Cost of acquisition + remaining debt + operating costs

If acquisition is cheaper, it could make economic sense.

This is essentially a financial restructuring exercise, not ideological nationalisation.

4. Convert guaranteed returns into competitive market arrangements

Pakistan should gradually move away from a system where investors are guaranteed returns regardless of utilisation.

Future power contracts should emphasise:

Competitive bidding;

Transparent auctions;

Realistic demand forecasting;

Reduced sovereign guarantees;

Local-currency financing where feasible;

Limited foreign exchange indexation;

Risk sharing between investors and consumers.

5. Investigate the tax issue separately

If particular IPPs are receiving:

Inappropriate tax exemptions;

Preferential treatment;

Special exemptions not justified by law,

those arrangements should be reviewed.

But again, a distinction is important:

A lawful tax exemption may be politically unwise but legally valid.

Pakistan can change tax policy prospectively, subject to contractual and constitutional constraints.

My strongest recommendation: don’t use the word “nationalisation” as the first weapon

I would recommend a policy called something like:

Pakistan Power Sector Sovereignty and Public Interest Recovery Programme

Its objectives would be:

 Phase 1 — Transparency

Publish every major IPP contract and amendment.

Phase 2 — Forensic audit

Determine actual costs and profits.

Phase 3 — Legal review

Identify corruption, fraud, illegality and contractual breaches.

Phase 4 — Renegotiation

Reduce excessive returns and capacity charges.

Phase 5 — Selective buyouts

Acquire plants where the financial mathematics clearly favour Pakistan.

Phase 6 — Prosecution and recovery

Where corruption is proven, pursue individuals and recover assets.

Phase 7 — Market reform

Ensure Pakistan never again signs contracts that create unlimited public liabilities.

My overall conclusion

Yes, Pakistan has the sovereign capacity to nationalise IPPs.

But nationalising all IPPs on the blanket theory of “odious contracts” would probably expose Pakistan to enormous legal and financial risks unless illegality, corruption or other recognised grounds could be established for particular contracts.

The more powerful—and legally defensible—strategy would be:

> Audit everything. Publish everything. Prosecute corruption. Challenge illegal contracts. Renegotiate unfair but valid contracts. Buy out plants where economically cheaper. Retire inefficient capacity.

The tragedy, if the underlying allegations are substantiated, is not merely that Pakistan signed expensive power contracts. It is that a state facing chronic fiscal weakness may have committed future taxpayers and consumers to long-term obligations without adequately protecting the public interest.

That is precisely why the solution should be forensic, legal, economic and evidence-based—not merely political.

             —————————————————————————————-

The Honourable Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad, Pakistan

Subject: An Urgent Appeal to Raise the Question of Jammu and Kashmir and Grave Human Rights Concerns at the BRICS Summit in India

Honourable Prime Minister,

With the highest respect, I wish to submit that the forthcoming BRICS gathering in India scheduled for 12–13 September 2026 present an opportune and exceptionally important occasion for Pakistan to bring renewed international attention to the unresolved question of Jammu and Kashmir and the resultant prolonged genocide of Kashmiris by the Indian forces in the cover up of false terrorism mantra which was a music for selected audiences.

As such, in view of the recent enhanced profile of Pakistan in the realm of its international incredible military and diplomatic achievements, it was right time to launch a diplomatic offensive against Indian acts of ongoing daily genocide and persecution against the Indian Muslims community with particular reference to highest level Human Rights violations of IIOJ&K Muslims.

The BRICS forum offer Pakistan an important opportunity to engage strongly with friendly countries and influential members of the international community, including China, Saudi Arabia (both our staunch friends), the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and Indonesia, so as to impress upon the world the urgency of addressing the continuing dispute, the human rights concerns reported from Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), and the serious consequences of leaving this long-standing conflict unresolved.

Kashmir: A Question of International Peace, Human Rights and the UN Charter

The question of Jammu and Kashmir cannot simply be dismissed as an internal matter. It remains a matter that has historically been considered by the United Nations Security Council and is associated with a series of UN resolutions and mechanisms.

The right of an occupied or colonized population to struggle for self-determination is rooted in the UN Charter and has been explicitly elaborated through multiple UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions.

1. The United Nations Charter establishes the foundational legal bedrock for self-determination: Article 1(2): Outlines the primary purpose of the UN to develop friendly relations among nations based on “respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. “Article 55: Reiterates that peaceful and friendly relations among nations are based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination.

2. The UN General Assembly over the decades passed several landmark resolutions that progressively defined the right of peoples under foreign occupation, alien domination, or colonial rule to resist and struggle for liberation by all available means, including armed struggle. “UNGA Resolution 1514 (1960): Known as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It declares that alien subjugation and exploitation constitute a denial of fundamental human rights.

(https://www.jmcc.org/en/Article/259/United-Nations-General-Assembly-Resolution-1514),

(https://www.quora.com/How-do-UN-resolutions-like-1514-and-72-92-support-the-right-to-self-determination-in-cases-like-the-Falklands-and-Gibraltar)

UNGA Resolution 2625 (1970): The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations. It states that peoples resisting forcible actions that deprive them of their right to self-determination “are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.” UNGA Resolution 3314 (1974): The Definition of Aggression. Article 7 explicitly protects the right of peoples forcibly deprived of self-determination; particularly those under colonial, racist, or alien regimes “to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support.”

 (https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/7/20/palestinians-have-a-legal-right-to-armed-struggle),

 (https://www.cjpme.org/fs_236)

UNGA Resolution 37/43 (1982)

This is the most direct and legally explicit resolution on the matter. Section 2 explicitly: “…Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for their independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial domination, apartheid and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle.”

Pakistan should continue to emphasize that the people of Jammu and Kashmir possess the right to determine their political future in accordance with the relevant principles of the United Nations Charter and applicable UN resolutions, “including armed struggle” which under no circumstances repeat no circumstance can be called as TERRORISM.

The principles of self-determination are reflected, among other provisions, in Articles 1 and 55 of the UN Charter and were subsequently reaffirmed in important General Assembly resolutions, including Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 and other relevant international instruments.

Furthermore, Security Council resolutions concerning Jammu and Kashmir, including Resolutions 47 (1948), 80 (1950) and 98 (1952); form an important part of the international history and legal framework surrounding the dispute.

Pakistan should therefore firmly reject attempts to erase the international character and historical UN dimension of the Kashmir dispute.

The continuing presence and relevance of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), together with the longstanding treatment of the dispute in UN records and documentation, should be highlighted as evidence that the international dimensions of the Kashmir question cannot simply be wished away through unilateral assertions.

The Mischaracterisation of the Kashmiri Struggle

Honourable Prime Minister, Pakistan should clearly and consistently challenge the attempt to portray every expression of Kashmiri resistance, political aspiration and demand for self-determination as “terrorism.” Yes the usurpation of Right of self-determination is TERRORISM.

There must be a clear distinction between terrorism, which must be condemned in all its forms and manifestations, and the internationally recognised principle that peoples are entitled to pursue their political rights and aspirations in accordance with international law.

Pakistan must urge the international community not to permit the language of counter-terrorism to be misused as a means of silencing legitimate political grievances, suppressing peaceful dissent, or preventing international scrutiny of alleged human rights violations.

India must not be permitted to use the label of “terrorism” as a blanket shield against legitimate questions concerning the treatment of the people of IIOJK.

The Need for International Scrutiny of Human Rights Violations

The seriousness of human rights concerns in Kashmir has already attracted international attention.

The reports issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, including its landmark 2018 report on Kashmir, raised serious concerns and called for further investigation into alleged violations and abuses.

The international community has already acknowledged the seriousness of this issue. The first-ever UN Human Rights report on Kashmir (2018), issued by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), called for an international inquiry into multiple violations committed in Kashmir.  

Link: – https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23198

This should be a central element of Pakistan’s diplomatic presentation.

Pakistan should call upon the international community to ensure that allegations of unlawful killings, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, restrictions on fundamental freedoms and other serious violations are independently and impartially examined.

No country, regardless of its size, influence or strategic importance, should be beyond accountability where credible allegations of grave violations of international human rights or humanitarian law arise.

The international community has, in other situations, established investigative mechanisms and accountability processes in response to serious allegations of atrocities. The principle must therefore be applied consistently and without selectivity.

Pakistan should accordingly call for:

• an independent, impartial and internationally credible investigation into serious allegations of human rights violations in IIOJK;
• meaningful access for relevant UN human rights mechanisms and international observers;
• accountability for individuals found responsible through due process of law;
• and, where the evidence and applicable international law warrant it, consideration of appropriate international accountability mechanisms.

The principle must be simple and universal: there can be no double standards in the application of international law, human rights and accountability.

A Challenge to the World: No Double Standards on Terrorism or Human Rights

Honourable Prime Minister, recent statements by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi regarding terrorism provide Pakistan with an important opportunity to challenge the international community, and India itself, on the principle of consistency.

Prime Minister Modi has repeatedly argued that terrorism must be condemned as a matter of principle rather than convenience and that there should be no double standards in combating terrorism.

Pakistan should respond by emphasizing that there must likewise be no double standards in the protection of human rights, the application of international law, or the pursuit of accountability for serious violations.

If the world must speak with one voice against terrorism, it must also speak with one voice against:

• unlawful killings;
• arbitrary detention;
• enforced disappearances;
• collective punishment;
• restrictions on fundamental freedoms;
• and the suppression of the legitimate political rights of peoples.

The fight against terrorism cannot become a justification for ignoring credible allegations of grave violations of human rights.

Nor should accusations of terrorism be used selectively for political purposes.

Pakistan should therefore call upon India to demonstrate the same commitment to transparency and accountability that it demands from others.

The Pahalgam Incident and Pakistan’s Call for an Independent Investigation

Pakistan should also publicly reiterate the position expressed by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif regarding the tragic Pahalgam incident of April 2025.

Pakistan’s willingness to participate in a neutral, transparent and credible international investigation should be repeatedly placed before the international community.

As the Prime Minister stated:

“The recent tragedy in Pahalgam is yet another example of this perpetual blame game, which must come to a grinding halt. Continuing with its role as a responsible country, Pakistan is open to participating in any neutral, transparent and credible investigation.”

Pakistan should therefore challenge India openly and unequivocally:

If India is confident in its allegations, why should it fear a neutral, transparent and internationally credible investigation?

The principle of accountability cannot be applied selectively.

A country that calls for international unity against terrorism should itself be prepared to support credible and impartial mechanisms for establishing facts.

Truth should never be feared.

Kashmir and the Threat to International Peace

The unresolved Kashmir dispute is not merely a bilateral political disagreement.

It remains a dangerous flashpoint between two nuclear-armed states.

Any serious escalation between Pakistan and India carries consequences far beyond South Asia. Continued instability, military confrontation and the absence of a durable political settlement threaten regional, and potentially international, peace and security.

For this reason alone, the international community cannot afford indifference.

The world must recognize that a just and peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute is essential not only for the people of Kashmir but also for lasting peace and stability throughout South Asia.

Pakistan should impress upon world leaders that silence and inaction do not resolve conflicts, they merely allow them to deepen.

Suggested Diplomatic Objectives

In light of the above, I respectfully submit that Pakistan should use the forthcoming international platforms to pursue the following objectives:

1. Expose the misuse of the term “terrorism” to delegitimise legitimate political grievances and the Kashmiri demand for self-determination.

2. Reaffirm the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination in accordance with the relevant principles of the UN Charter and applicable UN resolutions.

3. Highlight the serious human rights concerns in IIOJK, including the concerns documented by international human rights mechanisms, and call for independent international scrutiny.

4. Demand accountability for grave violations and support appropriate international legal mechanisms wherever evidence and international law justify such action.

5. Call for unrestricted and credible international investigation into serious allegations of human rights abuses.

6. Challenge double standards in the global application of counter-terrorism principles, insisting that terrorism must be condemned everywhere, but that human rights violations must also be condemned everywhere. Moreover, False Flag operations are the biggest manifestations of war crimes.

7. Reiterate Pakistan’s offer to participate in a neutral, transparent and credible investigation into the Pahalgam incident, and call upon India to accept impartial fact-finding rather than relying on accusation and counter-accusation.

8. Warn the international community of the dangers posed by the unresolved Kashmir dispute, particularly the risk of escalation between two nuclear-armed neighbours.

A Historic Diplomatic Opportunity

Honourable Prime Minister, the forthcoming BRICS engagement and the diplomatic opportunities associated with the 81st Session starting on September 8, 2026 of the United Nations General Assembly provide Pakistan with a critical opportunity to renew the world’s conscience on Kashmir.

Pakistan must speak clearly, confidently and courageously.

The message should be that Pakistan seeks neither confrontation for its own sake nor political rhetoric without purpose. Pakistan seeks justice, peace, accountability, human dignity and a durable settlement in accordance with international law and the aspirations of the people concerned.

The international community must be reminded that principles cannot be selective.

There can be no double standards:

• No double standards on terrorism.
• No double standards on human rights.
• No double standards on international law.
• No double standards on accountability.
• No double standards on the right of peoples to determine their future.

Pakistan should use every available diplomatic forum to ensure that the question of Kashmir is not forgotten and that the voices and rights of the Kashmiri people continue to be heard internationally.

It is respectfully hoped that Your Excellency will seize this important moment to present Pakistan’s position with clarity and moral force and to call upon the international community to act consistently in defence of peace, justice and human dignity.

Respectfully submitted,

Syed Nayyar Uddin Ahmad

Lahore

7 September 2026

nayyarahmad51@gmail.com

The writer is a senior corporate leader and strategic analyst with over five decades of experience. His thought-provoking visionary insights have reshaped global discourse, capturing the attention of world leaders. His writings have not only resonated with heads of state and governments but have also influenced the foreign policies of the United States and other major powers.